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ABSTRACT
In my dissertation I explore three independent, but related, topics on China's energy
issues. First, I examine the drivers for provincial energy-intensity trends in China, and
finds that technology innovation is the key driver. Then, to understand how technology
innovation takes place, I examine coal-to-liquids technology and argue that companies'
business diversification strategies are the key driver for the coal-to-liquids development in
China. Third, I study the carbon pricing carbon capture and storage, which supplements
the other two from the perspective of finance: the impact of carbon price on investments
on carbon capture and storage for power plants.
(1) Provincial energy-intensity (EI) change in China: a case study of three provinces
El trends of individual provinces vary, although the whole country shows declining energy
intensity. The energy-intensity trends in the following three provinces seem especially
interesting: Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, and Ningxia, because they represent three typical
El trends in China, increasing, nearly constant, and decreasing. Then why and what is
the driver for this difference in energy-intensity trends? I argue that technology innovation
plays a key role. I also explore the economic structures and development of renewable
energy in three provinces to shed light on how these might affect energy-intensity change
in these regions.
(2) Coal to liquids: why and how it makes the case in China
Different from Europe and the United States, China is actively developing coal-to-liquids
technologies and projects. In contrast to the conventional wisdom that in China the
central govemment mandates and guides coal liquefaction to ensure energy security, I
argue that the diversification strategy of state-owned coal companies is another key
driver for coal-liquefaction development in China, in addition to the state interest and
policy that initiated this move. Given current extensive conversation and debate on
Chinese technology innovation capability, my research sheds light on the innovation
system in China and provides implications for technology policy and investments.
(3) The impact of future carbon prices on CCS investment for power plants in China
I answer two related questions about the development of carbon capture and storage(CCS) and power generation technologies in China: (1) what is the breakeven
carbon-dioxide price to justify CCS installation investment for Integrated Gasification
Combined Cycle (IGCC) and pulverized coal (PC) power plants, and (2) what are the
risks associated with investment for CCS. In this analysis, I also advise investors on the
impact of capital and fuel costs on the carbon price and suggest optimal timing for CCS
investment.
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Provincial Energy-intensity Change in China: A Case
Study of Three Provinces
Abstract
China has incurred a steady decrease of energy intensity (El, energy consumption per
unit of gross domestic product (GDP)) since the 1980s, for example, a decrease of 29.3%
from 1995 to 2004. El trends of individual provinces vary, although the whole country
shows declining energy intensity. The energy-intensity trends in the following three
provinces seem especially interesting: Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, and Ningxia, because
they represent three typical El trends in China, increasing, nearly constant, and
decreasing. It brings forth a puzzle that Ningxia and Inner Mongolia, with developed
renewable energy industry and clean energy technology, have increasing or almost
constant El, while Liaoning, which has a heavy industry base and does not have much
renewable energy capacity, experienced an El decrease. Whether or to what an extent
does the renewable energy development impact energy intensity? What are other
reasons driving the El trends in these regions? How is economic development interacting
with energy-intensity issues? In this paper, I examine underlying reasons for differences
in energy-intensity trends. Furthermore I tackle that puzzle by analyzing determinants of
the El trends and examining economic structures of these regions.
1. Introduction
China has embraced a steady decrease of energy intensity (El, energy consumption per
unit of GDP) since the 1980s. This trend continued in the past decade. From 1995 to
2004, the El of China decreased from 163.25 to 115.42 kilograms standard coal
equivalent (kgce) per thousand Yuan (1995 deflated value), a decrease of 29.3%
(Tablel-1 and Figure 1-1).
Scholars have studied China's El at the national level from the perspectives of structural
change and real energy intensity (Smil 1990, Polenske & Lin 1993, Sinton & Levine 1994,
Lin & Polenske 1995, Garbaccio 1999, Zhang 2003, Polenske 2007). There are mixed
opinions. Some argue that structural change was a main factor responsible for the El
decrease in the early 1980s when China started the "Open-door" policy, while some find
that technology innovation was the main driver for the intensity change (For instance,
Polenske & Lin (1993) finds that technology innovation accounted for 80% of the
reduction in this period). This structural change factor still worked in decreasing China's
El in the late 1980s and 1990s, but its effect was less significant than the factor of real
energy intensity, which is caused by technology innovation. Based on firm-level data,
Zhang (2003) further argues that 88% of the cumulative energy savings in the industrial
sector were attributed to real energy intensity change, with approximately 80% of such
savings from the four chief energy-using sub-sectors (i.e., ferrous metals, chemicals,
nonmetal mineral products, and machinery). Polenske & McMichael (2002) also find that
technology innovation is the primary factor for the El decrease in those firms in the coal
industry.
Few analysts have conducted studies concerning El trends of individual provinces in
China. In fact the El trends of individual provinces vary, while the whole country shows
declining energy intensity. Among all the 30 provinces or municipalities (not including
Taiwan and Hong Kong Special Administration Region and Macau), the following three
provinces are especially interesting: Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, and Ningxia (Table 1-1
and Figure 1-1). They represent three typical El trends in China, increase, no significant
change, and decrease, respectively. As shown in Table1-1, Ningxia, a less developed
province in the northwest but with a well-developed solar power industry, has
experienced an El increase over the past decades, from 308.24 in 1995 to 427.60 kgce
per thousand Yuan in 2004 (1995 deflated value), an increase of 38.7% over ten years.
Inner Mongolia, famous for wind and solar power and coal gasification industries, exhibits
a roughly constant El over this period, from 258.26 kgce per thousand Yuan in 1995 to
220.53 in 2004 (1995 deflated value), but basically fluctuating around 200. Liaoning, a
province with considerable heavy industry, like most provinces, has a steadily decreasing
El trend. Its El decreased from 276.4 kgce per thousand Yuan in 1995 to 122.9 in 2004
(1995 deflated value), a decrease of 55.6%.
Table 1- 1: Energy Intensity, 1995-2004 (Kgce per 1,000 Yuan GDP)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
National 163.25 160.74 138.44 123.21 115.31 108.54 98.30 98.38 104.35 115.42
Inner Mongolia 258.26 204.39 248.58 198.75 197.29 191.16 186.73 181.53 175.84 220.53
Liaoning 276.39 218.62 208.69 167.77 148.65 150.86 140.38 132.56 128.40 122.86
Ningxia 308.24 227.73 240.68 233.61 241.20 * * * * 427.60
Note: *: data of energy consumption by sector unavailable from the sources below. Therefore the energy
intensity cannot be calculated here. However, Polenske (2007) shows the energy intensity data of Ningxia for
this period and indicates that Ningxia has a climbing curve of energy intensity over these 10 years.
Source: SSB&NDRC 1996-2005, SSB 1996-2005; edited by the author
The past decades have also witnessed China's development of renewable energy, which
can be dated back to 1982 when the central government issued "Suggestions to reinforce
the development of rural energy." (NREL, 2006) More efforts occurred since 1995 when
the State Planning Commission, together with other commissions, issued the Outline on
New and Renewable Energy Development in China (NREL, 2006). In 2001, the State
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) proposed its Tenth Five-Year Plan for
Sustainable Development, including the Tenth Five-Year Plan for New and Renewable
Energy Commercialization Development. Five years later, in 2006, China passed its
Renewable Energy Law with a firm objective of boosting the use of renewable energy
capacity up to 10 percent of the country's total energy consumption by the year 2020
(compared to 3% in 2003). Totally, since the 1980s, China has issued more than 20
national policies or laws to promote renewable energy development and has achieved
considerable progress (NREL 2004a&b, 2006). China's renewable energy development
has also received attention from multiple aspects. National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (NREL) under the U.S. Department of Energy keeps track of China's
renewable energy policy. Some scholars, such as Wang (2005), conclude that renewable
energy in China is still underutilized that it is even disregarded in official figures. Some
reports also state that some provinces still rely on coal industries for economic growth (21
Century Economics 2005).
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Figure 1- 1: China Energy Intensity from 1995 to 2004, National and Provincial
Source: Table 1-1
Renewable energy development, on the one hand, has a positive effect on the El
decrease. Martinot (2001 a, 2001b) reviews the World Bank's renewable energy projects
in China and finds that these projects contribute to energy efficiency or decreasing El in
China by promoting the awareness of energy conservation. On the other hand,
renewable energy development is supposed to help decrease El as it brings forth
technology innovation of energy use (NREL 1999, Martinot 2001a&b, Gao et al. 2005).
For example, coal gasification, an innovation introduced in this period in Inner Mongolia,
not only decreases energy intensity but reduces carbon-dioxide emissions (Moniz &
Deutch 2007, SEPA 2004).
Within this background, Inner Mongolia has achieved significant growth in its renewable
energy, especially wind power and solar power. Inner Mongolia has the highest wind
power potential in the country and the total wind power capacity by the end of 2005 was
166,000 kw, ranking 1st in China, with a projected capacity of 4,000,000kw by 2010
(North News 2006). Ningxia's solar industry dates back to the 1970s, and the government
plans to build up its annual solar power capacity, which can substitute for 432,000 tons of
coal equivalent, about 5% of its annual coal consumption in 2004 (San 2004). Liaoning,
which has a heavy industry base, does not have much renewable energy capacity so far.
It becomes a puzzle that Ningxia and Inner Mongolia, with developed renewable energy
industry arid clean energy technology, have increasing or almost constant El, while
Liaoning, which has a heavy industry base and does not have much renewable energy
capacity, experienced an El decrease. In this analysis, I tackle this puzzle by exploring
what drives the changes of energy intensity in Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia. I
also probe what factors prevent renewable energy from playing a role in decreasing
energy intensity. In this paper, I shed light on what factors account for El changes in
those regions and what factors hinder or reduce the effect of renewable energy.
2. Three Provinces
Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, and Ningxia are located in the north of China (Figure 1-2). Inner
Mongolia has an area of 1.18 million kilometers (km) occupying about 12% of China's
land area. In 2004, it had a population of about 24 million and its GDP was 271 billion
Chinese Yuan (Yuan), which makes its GDP per capita rank 12th among all the provinces
and municipalities in China. Its energy consumption occupied 3.9% of the national total,
lower than Liaoning's but two times more than Ningxia's 2004 GDP. Liaoning has a larger
population but smaller area than Inner Mongolia. Liaoning as of 2004 achieved a per
capita GDP of 16,300 Yuan, almost double the national average of 9,649 Yuan.
Accordingly, its energy consumption is higher, claiming 5.7% of the national total.
Ningxia, the smallest province amongst the three, consumed about 1.3% of the national
total energy in 2004 for its GDP of 46 billion Yuan. Ningxia's per capita 2004 GDP is
about 81% of China's average, placing it as the 30th region (the second smallest in
China, only higher than Tibet).
Inner Mongolia is famous for its abundance of coal and is an important coal base in north
China (it also has other resources, such as cashmere, natural gas, and rare earth
elements, and more deposits of naturally occurring niobium, zirconium and others). It
planned to double its annual coal production, from 260 million tonnes in 2005 to 500
million tonnes per year by 2010 (PDO, 2005). Shenhua Group is the largest coal
company in China (see the coming section), comparable to Peabody of the United States.
Inner Mongolia develops its industry around coal, power generation, and so on. Six
industries, energy, chemicals, metallurgy, equipment manufacturing, processing of farm
produce, and hi-tech products, are stressed by the provincial government as competitive
industries.
Liaoning is one of China's most important industrial bases, covering a wide range of
industries, such as machinery, electronics, metal refining, petroleum, chemical industries,
coal, and so on. It has the most iron, magnetite, diamond, and boron deposits among all
province-level subdivisions of China. The history of being a base for heavy industry in
China since the birth of the People's Republic of China and its abundance of iron and
other resources make Liaoning a key producer of steel in China. It has several large steel
corporations, such as Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation, and Benxi Steel Group
Corporation. In 2006, Liaoning accounted for 1/6 of the total steel production in China.'
Ningxia is a relatively undeveloped region, by its GDP. Coal is its key resource and the
coal industry has become a base industry in Ningxia. East Ningxia Coal Basin is one of
the 13 main huge coal production areas in China, with a proven reserve of 27.34 billion
tonnes and a potential reserve of 139.43 billion tonnes (SSB 2005). Developed by
NingXia Coal Industry Corporation (merged with Shenhua Group from Inner Mongolia),
this coal base will become an industrial park with mainly energy-intensive industries
including coal mining, coke making, coal tar, and petroleum products. Ma Qizhi (2006),
then the governor of Ningxia, stated that "The project of East Ningxia Coal Base is the
key for ensuring our GDP growth of more than 10% per year until 2020."
Table 1- 2: Three Provinces, 2004
Area Population GDP GDP per Energy consumption
ca pita(Yuan) (10,000 tonnes(kin2 ) (Persons) (Billion of standa rd co al
Yuan) equivalent)
Inner Mongolia 1,183,000 23,840,000 271 11,400 5,642(3rd) (23rd) (23rd) (12th) (3.9%)
Liaoning 145,900 42,170,000 687 16,300 8,180(21st) (14th) (8th) (9th) (5.7%)Ningxia 66,000 5,880,000 46 7,830 1,844(27th) (29th) (3 0th) (23rd) (1.3%)
National 9,600,000 1,295,330,000 12,496 9,649 144,227
Source: SSB 2005, edited by the author.
1 See http://www.1n.stats.gov.cn/jrhn/gy.htm
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Figure 1- 2: Location of Three Provinces in China
Source: http-/chinamash.conwp-content/uploads/2006/08/china-map.jpg
3. Methodology
In this analysis, energy intensity is the amount of energy consumption per unit of gross
domestic product (GDP) or gross regional product (GRP). Energy consumed is measured
by 10,000 tonnes of standard coal equivalent (based on calorific value calculation). GDP
is deflated into real GDP, based on 1995 value, and GRP is also converted into 1995
values via the current price index, which is calculated by the MIT research group led by
Professor Polenske. Energy consumption and GDP/GRP data (1995 through 2004) come
from the China Energy Statistical Yearbook and China Statistical Yearbook.
Shift-share analysis is a framework to explore energy intensity. Analysts use several
different methods, but the Laspeyres method is used extensively (Zhang 2003). Park
(1992) proposes this method, calculating changes in energy consumption with respect to
a constant year. The change of energy consumption between two years, AEt = E - E,
is interpreted by three components: AEt, = AE., + AE,,, + AEt + R. AE.t is a
change in aggregate production (output effect, the energy consumption of the second
year based on the same energy intensity and industrial structure of the base year minus
the energy consumption of the base year). AE, represents a change of consumption
due to changes in composition of aggregate production (structural effect), and AEi, is
the intensity effect, which shows the changes result from the adoption of more efficient
technologies and techniques (for detailed formulas about calculating these effects, see
Zhang 2003, or Park 1992). R is the residual, which is not equal to zero, and it will grow
generally if t increases, which leaves part of the observed change in energy consumption
unexplained. This constitutes a shortcoming of the Laspeyres methods and some
scholars, such as Zhang (2003), derive their own equations to eliminate this residual.
Therefore, I adopt the method developed by Polenske and Lin (1993). Their method
clearly decomposes the energy consumption into three parts, each of which can be
calculated and explained easily.
E= eo -O, + [(e, - eo)- O,,] + [(e,, - e,1 )- O,,] (1)
(constant share) (industrial mix) (efficiency change)
where E, is the total energy consumption in year t, O, is the GRP (or GDP for the
whole nation) in year t. O, is the GRP for each sector i in year t. eo is the energy
intensity for the whole region in the base year, and accordingly, e,, and e,1 are the
energy intensity for industry i in the base year and year t.
The constant share indicates the energy consumption under the condition that the energy
intensity in year t remains at the same level as that of the base year. The effect of
industrial structure on energy use is illustrated by the industry-mix component. A negative
industry mix means that the industrial structure has become less energy intensive
compare with that in the base year, and vice versa. Efficiency change is similar to the
intensity effect shown by the Laspeyres method, measuring the change of energy
efficiency.
If we extend the items on the right-hand side of Equation (1) and add them, the sum is
exactly equal to the item on the left-hand side, which makes no residual to appear in the
equation. In other words, the energy intensity can be fully explained by the three effects
defined on the right-hand side of the equation. Furthermore, by dividing both sides of
Equation (1) byO,, an equation describing the impacts on energy intensity can be
obtained.
et eo +X [(e, ,- e,.-0j,] 0, + [(e,, ei,>.0j,]/0, (2)
(constant share) (industrial mix) (efficiency change)
where e, = E, lot is the energy intensity for the whole region in year t. e, can be
smaller or greater than e. depending on the simultaneous effects from the industry mix
and efficiency change. Obviously the combined effect of industry mix and efficiency
change determines the level of energy intensity in a given year.
Energy efficiency can be broadly defined as the introduction of new equipment, a new
process, and/or new techniques, which can influence the amount of energy consumed
per unit of output. A structural change reflects the shift in the industrial composition.
Ideally, using a finer industrial classification can tell more about the shift and yield a more
reasonable explanation, but data availability remains a challenge. Similar to Polenske
and Lin (1993), I use China's classification of six material-production sectors: the Primary
Industry (Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, Fishery & Water Conservancy); Industry;
Construction, Transportation, Storage, Postal & Telecommunications Services;
Wholesale, Retail Trade & Catering Service; and The Others. Using this classification is
also determined by the data. The energy consumption data for different sectors is
provided in the China Energy Statistical Yearbook which designates 7 sectors (the first
five are the same as the above. The 6th and 7th sectors are Residential Consumption and
Others, respectively). The GRP data are from the China Statistical Yearbook, which has
data about more sectors but only the first five are same as those in the China Energy
Statistical Yearbook. In this context, I adopt the first five sectors plus a sixth "the others"
which includes all the other sectors.
4. Energy-intensity Changes
In this section, I present the results of shift-share analysis both for China and for the three
provinces. As explained in Table 1-1, Ningxia Province energy consumption data by
sector for 2000, 2001, and 2002 are not available, which leaves the 2000-2003
shift-share analysis blank. For the convenience of reading, I show only the results of the
shift-share analysis. Readers can find tables about energy consumption by sector, and
GDP/GRP by sector in the Appendix.
Table 1-3 shows the shift-share analysis for China's energy intensity in the past ten years
(1995-2004). This country's energy intensity continues to decrease from 1995 to
2001/2002, from 163.25 to 98.3 kg of standard coal equivalent per 100 Yuan. I note that
its El shows an increasing trend in 2003 and 2004. In 2003 China's El increases by 6 El
units, while in 2004 this increase is accelerated to be 11 El units. Also note that the
industrial-mix signs are all positive (except the value for 1998) in these ten years. This
indicates that China's industrial structure in these ten years actually increases its energy
intensity. This further might suggest that it is hard for China to reduce its energy intensity
through changing its industrial structure. Note that the 1998 industrial-mix value is
negative, -0.64. In 1998 China started its "laid off" employment reform by laying off many
employees of state-owned companies and closing some old, inefficient, or unprofitable
state-owned companies, which had great impacts on China's industrial structure.
Efficiency shift played a role in decreasing energy intensity in most of those years except
2003 and 2004. During this period, changes in the efficiency shift account for the
decrease of energy intensity, while changes in the industrial mix mostly increase the
energy intensity of China.
Table 1- 3: Shift-share Analysis of Energy Intensity in China's Material Production Sector
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Constant 163.25 160.74 138.44 123.21 115.31 108.54 98.30 98.38 104.35share
Industrial 0.92 2.71 -0.64 0.95 2.39 0.34 0.34 1.10 0.29mix
Efficiency 
-3.42 -25.02 -14.59 -8.85 -9.16 -10.58 -0.26 4.88 10.77shift
Total El 163.25 160.74 138.44 123.21 115.31 108.54 98.30 98.38 104.35 115.42
Unit: Kilograms of standard coal equivalent per 1,000 Yuan of output
Source: calculated from the related tables in Appendix
In the case of Inner Mongolia, the effect of the efficiency shift is still significantly larger
than that of industrial mix. Table 1-4 and Figure 1-2 show these two effects. In the past
decade, the El of Inner Mongolia has decreased and then increased, fluctuating about
roughly 200 El units. Industrial mix in general does not contribute to energy efficiency
except in 1998 and 2000. In contrast, for most years, the efficiency shift is negative,
decreasing energy intensity. This effect is noticeable especially in 1996 and 1998. In the
early 2000s, the effect of the efficiency shift is relatively minute, and in 2004, this effect
actually is positive on energy intensity. Figure 1-2 offers an explicit comparison between
these two effects. Regardless of being negative or positive, the efficiency shift always has
a larger influence on the total El than the industrial mix does, which matches the trend at
the national level discussed above.
Table 1- 4: Shift-share Analysis of Energy intensity in Inner Mongolia's Material Production
Sector
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Constant 258.26 204.39 248.58 198.75 197.29 191.16 186.73 181.53 175.84share
Industrial 10.06 6.77 -0.51 3 -2.36 2.06 1.13 1.62 12.50mix
Efficiency -63.93 37.42 -49.32 -4.45 -3.78 -6.50 -6.33 -7.31 32.19shift
Total El 258.26 204.39 248.58 198.75 197.29 191.16 186.73 181.53 175.84 220.53
Unit: Kilograms of standard coal equivalent per 1,000 Yuan of output
Source: calculated from the related tables in Appendix
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Figure 1- 3: Inner Mongolian Industrial Mix and Efficiency Shift
Source: Table 1-4
Liaoning shows a constant decrease of energy intensity except in the year 2000, which is
slightly higher than the previous year and then returns to a lower level. This indicates that
this province has made progress in improving its energy efficiency. Examining the effects
of industrial mix and efficiency shift, we can easily find that its efficiency shift has been
continuously negative, while the industry mix varies above and below zero. The
efficiency-shift trend clearly shows that, Liaoning, in the past ten years, has introduced
new energy technology or other techniques that improve energy efficiency and has made
steady energy reductions. Different from Inner Mongolia, Liaoning also makes more
progress in optimizing its industrial structure: in 5 out of the total 9 years the industrial mix
is negative. Still, efficiency shift remains a main force in changing energy intensity. From
both the table and the figure, we see that generally speaking the efficiency shift has
higher values than the industrial mix.
Table 1- 5: Shift-share Analysis of Energy Intensity in Liaoning's Material Production Sector
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Constant 276.39 218.62 208.69 167.77 148.65 150.86 140.38 132.56 128.40share
Industrial -6.76 3.72 -5.47 1.32 5.16 -3.09 -1.35 0.50 -2.53mix
Efficiency -51.01 -13.65 -35.44 -20.44 -2.96 -7.39 -6.48 -4.66 -3.01shift
Total El 276.39 218.62 208.69 167.77 148.65 150.86 140.38 132.56 128.40 122.86
Unit: Kilograms of standard coal equivalent per 1,000 Yuan of output
Source: calculated from the related tables in Appendix
kgce per 1,000 Yuan
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Figure 1- 4: Liaoning's Industrial Mix and Efficiency Shift
Source: Table 1-5
Due to data unavailability, we have only five years' data about shift and mix effects.
Based on these results, we can see first that, as a whole Ningxia Province has increasing
energy intensity in the period 1995 through 2004. Although its El in 1996 decreases to
227.7 from 308.2 in 1995, the coming three years actually have increasing energy
intensity. The 1997, 1998, and 1999 El stays basically at the same level (around 240 El
units), and then in 2004, it soars to 427.6, almost doubling that of 1996. In addition, the
efficiency shift does not stay constant, changing between positive and negative. The
years of 1996 and 2004 witness a significant negative efficiency shift compared to other
years but meanwhile the industrial mix also presents larger trade-offs, positive effect on
energy intensity. To some degree, we can infer that, on the one hand, Ningxia, a
relatively undeveloped region in China, has not improved its technology of utilizing
energy significantly in the past ten years. On the other hand, its industrial structure still
remains energy-intensive. We will explain this in detail in the coming section.
Table 1- 6: Shift-share Analysis of Energy Intensity in Ningxia's Material Production Sector
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Constant share 308.24 227.73 240.68 233.61 563.56
Industrial mix 10.06 0.48 -4.92 0.01 38.86
Efficiency shift -90.57 12.47 -2.15 7.58 
-74.83
Total El 308.24 227.73 240.68 233.61 241.20 427.60
Unit: Kilograms of standard coal equivalent per 1,000 Yuan of output
Source: calculated from the related tables in Appendix
kgce per 1,000 Yuan
0.
-50.
-100.
-150.
-200.
* Industrial mix 0 Efficiency shift
Figure 1- 5: Ningxia's Industrial Mix and Efficiency Shift
Source: Table 1-6
5. Energy investment, efficiency and renewable energy
In the previous section, we find that the energy-efficiency shift is the main factor
explaining the change of energy intensity either in China as a whole or in each of the
three provinces. As defined, we assume this efficiency effect is triggered by technology
innovation. In this context, we explore the investment in energy technology in China and
by examining the data from these provinces to understand the situation.
Table 1-7 describes the investment in technology improvements and transformation in
the energy industry by region in China. On average, China's investment in technology
has increased steadily in those years, from 0.441 Billion Yuan in 1991 to 3.549 Billion
Yuan in 2002, an increase of 700% in 11 years. Compared to this national average, Both
Inner Mongolia and Ningxia have underinvested. Ningxia's input remains roughly at the
level of 400 Million Yuan during this period. Its investment in 2002 is only 367 Million
Yuan, considering the factor of deflation, lower than that of 1995 which is 353 Million
Yuan. Ningxia has experienced a long-term underinvestment in technology updates and
transformation in energy industry. This underinvestment naturally cannot contribute to
increasing energy efficiency and can cause the efficiency shift to be insignificant in
decreasing energy intensity, which might well explain why this province, unlike many
peers in China, has an increasing energy-intensity curve in the past ten years. Inner
Mongolia, as shown in Figure 1-5, also experiences an underinvestment in this period.
Since 1996, its investment has always been less than half of that of the average national
level, and we can also find that from 1996 through 2000, Inner Mongolia invests about the
same amount for technologies in the energy industry, around 700 Million Yuan (roughly
90 Million US Dollars). We have illustrated that Inner Mongolia's energy intensity
basically has remained constant or only slightly decreased during 1996 through 2003,
which can be matched by its investment profile.
Note that Liaoning, in contrast with the other two provinces, in general, has increased the
technology investment annually. In 1991, Liaoning invested only 1,160 Million Yuan for
the technology innovation in energy industry, but this number tripled to 3.75 Billion Yuan
after four years. Then, from 1995, this investment continues to climb and reaches 9.2
Billion Yuan in 2002. The inputs of years around 1998 stay almost the same or only
slightly decreased, which might be connected to the 1998 "laid-off" reform when many
heavy industries or some other state-owned companies were shut down, which could
lead to the non-increase in energy technology investment. Figure 1-5 well illustrates this
trend. For each year, Liaoning's investment is more than double that of the provincial
average. These large investments benefit Liaoning in decreasing its energy intensity
remarkably. As discussed earlier, in 1995 Liaoning's energy intensity was 276.4 units
almost double that of the national value (163.4 units), but in 2004, Liaoning had
decreased this number to 122.86, very close to the national 115.42 El units. This
achievement, although we cannot show it strictly at this stage, can be reasonably
attributed to the continuously increasing inputs in energy technology investment by
Liaoning.
Table 1- 7: Investment in Technical Updates and Transformation in the Energy Industry
1991 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
National 4.41 14.59 17.03 19.38 22.21 24.38 29.47 31.63 35.49(provincial average*)
Inner Mongolia 3.55 13.82 6.93 6.49 6.38 7.85 7.84 9.31 17.05
Liaoning 11.60 37.51 48.92 65.92 65.18 62.77 71.39 84.49 91.94
Ningxia 1.88 3.53 3.95 5.15 5.12 4.00 3.97 3.96 3.67
Unit: 1 00M Yuan, current price
*: the average of 31 China's provinces and municipalities (not including Hong Kong, Macau andTaiwan), calculated from the national total divided by 31.
Note: 1992/1993/1994, and 2003/2004 data unavailable.
Source: China Energy Statistics Yearbook (1992-2005)
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Figure 1- 6: Investment in Technical Updates & Transformation in the Energy IndustrySource: Table 1-7
However, these investments in the energy industry are not necessarily directed to
renewable energy development. Due to China's long push and policy motivation for
developing renewable energy, we believe that these provinces, more or less, have some
renewable energy industries that might absorb some investment for energy technology
innovation and then contribute some to energy efficiency. In the following, I discuss the
development of renewable energy in these regions.
Unfortunately, due to the limitation of our data, we cannot analyze in detail the renewable
energy development in those three provinces. But we can still give brief description about
their status to yield some knowledge.
Ningxia province, given its geographic location, has a good potential for developing the
solar industry. Its solar industry development can be dated back to the 1970s with
technologies including solar stoves, solar water heaters, solar-powered houses, and
household solar PV systems. Yinchuan, the capital of Ningxia, ranks the 3rd, after Lasha
and Huhehaote, among all the 31 capital cities in China in terms of solar power potential
capacity. San (2004) shows that the 2003-2010 planning of Ningxia solar power
utilization will bring forth an annual reduction of energy consumption by 432,000 Tonnes
of Coal Equivalent (TCE), about 5% of its 2004 coal consumption. However, the
investment in the solar industry is still minimal: up to 2003, government investment for
rural energy has accumulatively amounted only to 28 million RMB (about 3.7 Million US
Dollars). Although having a relatively long history, the solar industry, the main renewable
industry in Ningxia, remains still at an infant stage and its minimal scale prevents it from
playing some noticeable role in bringing energy technology innovation or in reducing
energy intensity.
Inner Mongolia has the largest wind power potential in China. Up to 2005, the total
capacity of wind power was 166,000 kilowatt hours (kwh), the highest in China. However,
only 1% of this potential has been developed so far. Up to 2004, there were 158,000 mini
wind turbines, which supply 150,000 households with electricity. In 2010, this wind
capacity will reach 4,000,000kwh, about 25 times that of 2005. However, even this
planned amount, only accounts for 0.0075% of the electricity consumption by Inner
Mongolia in 2004, which is 53.6 billion kwh. Similar to Ningxia, Inner Mongolia has a
well-developed wind power industry, but it is still too little to decrease energy efficiency.
Due to data unavailability in Liaoning province, I cannot discuss more about its renewable
energy industry. Renewable energy is less developed compared to the other two
provinces. On the one hand, while the provincial govemment issues some policies or
laws, these regulations mainly direct renewable energy development to the rural areas,
which indicates that the scale is minimal. On the other hand, things are changing. In
Liaoning, energy conservation and developing renewable energy have been on the
provincial 11th 5-year planning agenda (Liaoning, 2006).
6. Industrial Structure
To play a role in decreasing energy efficiency, provincial authorities should promote the
renewable energy industry much more than they do at present. The minimal scales of
renewable energy in the three provinces explain why this industry cannot show the
expected effect of improving energy efficiency. In contrast, investments in energy
technology updates and transformation explain to a certain extent why there is difference
of energy shift effect among the provinces. We also see that the industry mix usually has
a minimal effect in changing energy intensity.
As mentioned before, the coal industries, energy-intensive sectors, are the main force
driving the economy of Inner Mongolia and Ningxia, and in Liaoning, the steel industry
plays a similar role, which is also an energy-intensive industry. Table 1-8 shows two
supporting companies in Inner Mongolia and Ningxia: Shenhua and Ningxia Coal. Each
of them is regarded as the main power fueling the GDP growth of its host province. As the
economy relies on these energy-intensive industries for growth, it may face intemal
challenges of adjusting the industrial structure to a better level for decreasing energy
intensity. Such a 'better level is a structure at which companies can produce same
outputs with less energy inputs. To understand the scale of such companies, for example,
Shenhua Corporation, we can compare it with Peabody, the largest U.S. coal company,
which made total revenue of 3.6 billion USD in 2004. Shenhua's 2004 revenue was 56.5
billion Yuan, about 7 billion USD, almost double that of Peabody.
Table 1- 8: Shenhua and Ningxia Coal
Assets Proved Annual coalRank Corporation (Billion Yuan) Reserve production Province(Billion tonnes) (Million tonnes)
1 Shenhua Corporation 188.8 > 223.6 121 Inner
Mongolia8 Ningxia Coal 25.1 24.1 33 NingxiaCorporation
Note: Ningxia Coal Corporation was merged by Shenhua in 2006.
Source: Companies' websites
7. Conclusion and Discussion
Through the shift-share analysis, I show that between 1995 and 2004, the energy
efficiency shift plays a main role in changing the energy intensity of China, and three of its
provinces, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning and Ningxia. Liaoning province, as a base of heavy
industry, still decreases its energy intensity through those years. Inner Mongolia and
Ningxia, although having a better developed renewable industry than Liaoning, have
experienced flat or climbing curves of energy intensity. Renewable energy development,
which is supposed to bring in new energy technology that can decrease energy intensity,
has not shown this effect in Inner Mongolia and Ningxia. This can be explained by the
minimal scale of this industry in both regions. The investment in the technology updates
and transformations in energy industry can in some way explain the effect of efficiency
shift in our three study provinces.
However, due to data limitations, I cannot further analyze the status of renewable energy
development in China and in particular in these three provinces. This prevents me from
examining what exactly renewable energy industry has brought to technology innovation.
This remains a problem for future research.
Another puzzle occurs. The fact that the energy-intensive coal industry remains a base
industry for both Inner Mongolia and Ningxia seems to explain why they cannot realize an
energy-intensity decrease. But Shanxi, the largest coal production province in China, has
successfully decreased its energy intensity in the past decades (Polenske 2007). Then
why can Shanxi do this decrease while Inner Mongolia and Ningxia cannot? This can also
be a question for future research. Both questions call for field trips in China to collect
data, interview companies, and government, to find appropriate answers.
Appendix
Note 1.
All data come from China Energy Statistics Yearbook 1996-2005, and China
Statistics Yearbook 1996-2005.
Note 2.
Energy consumption data are edited by the author from China Energy Statistics
Yearbook 1996-2005. The total consumption is composed of the following ten
sub-categories and is the sum of these ten after converting into standard coal
equivalent via calorific value calculation: coal total, coke, coke oven gas, other gas,
other coking products, petroleum products total, natural gas, heat, electricity, and
other energy.
These data tables with sub-categories are not attached here but are available upon
request from the author.
Note 3.
Sectors:
1. Farming,Forestry,Animal Husbandry,Fishery&Water Conservancy
2. Industry
3. Construction
4. Transportation, Storage, Postal, &Telecommunications Services
5. Wholesale, Retail Trade, & Catering Service
6. Residential consumption
7. Others
67. Sum of 6 and 7 to match the classification of GDP/GRP sectors
Table 1. Energy consumption in China's Material Production
equivalent based on calorific value calculation) Sector (10,000 tonnes standard coal
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 3,914.02 4, 124. 2) 4, 080. 69 4,076.28 4,239.55 4,286.98 4331.86 4,593.60 4,75412 5,818.18
2 69,930.63 74, 726 76 E, 823. 12 66,687.8 64,390.11 64,735.67 62,488.43 68,161.68 80, 39& 58 98, 381.39
3 897.41 97& 75 842. 26 1,091.69 1,599.52 1,736.29 1,090.17 1,203.09 1, 316 25 , 741.89
4 5,159.18 5,245.47 6, 550. 96 7249.47 8,325.87 8,977.14 9,128.13 9,909.21 11, 476 24 13,732.18
5 1,472.05 1,690.08 1,630.31 1738.9 1,975.12 1,993.65 2,048.23 2,219.21 2, 612.87 3,08.56
67 16,765.29 19, 160. 07 16,296. 37 14,385.74 14,935.93 15,378.63 15,379.76 16,379. M2 18, 216. 19 20, 452.03
Total 8,138.58 105,925.33 99,223.70 95,230. 06 95,46.10 97,108.36 94,468.58 1C2, 45. 71 118,77425 144, 227.23
Source: SSB&NDRC, multiple years
Table 2. China's Real GDP/GRP (100M RMB, All the figures are in constant 1995 prices)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 12,328.80 13,438.94 13,678.95 14,356.88 14,599.82 14,628.20 15,219.34 15,962.03 16,591.76 18,960.57
2 25,410.41 28,231.27 31,198.16 32,939.31 35,397.10 39,047.30 41,845.43 45,532.28 51,538.72 57,348.07
3 3,926.55 4,397.88 4,630.43 5,161.11 5,518.92 5,888.00 6,295.78 6,937.51 7,941.81 8,739.00
4 3,140.23 3,391.72 3,654.98 4,065.93 4,499.69 5,408.60 5,893.77 6,358.45 6,519.01 7,024.54
5 5,070.40 5,397.53 5,928.90 6,490.71 6,971.33 7,316.00 7,819.91 8,395.04 8,967.67 9,219.59
67 10,239.09 11,040.08 12,582.32 14,278.64 15,805.47 17,180.00 19,025.31 20,973.77 22,260.62 23,671.30
Total 60,115.49 65,897.42 71,673.74 77,292.58 82,792.34 89,468.10 96,099.53 104,159.08 113,819.60 124,963.08
Source: SSB&NDRC, multiple years
Table 3. Energy consumption in Inner Mongolia's Material Production Sector (10,000 tonnes standard
coal equivalent based on calorific value calculation)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 87.46 117.64 136.73 120.71 118.13 126.59 154.56 159.42 184.66 216.67
2 1,381.03 1,363.18 1,780.24 1,529.41 1,798.66 1,969.51 2,116.30 2,326.02 2,766.82 3,605.16
3 35.85 46.05 63.97 62.28 53.09 54.82 50.85 57.52 68.69 88.11
4 150.86 154.17 184.36 187.11 137.29 144.16 149.75 164.12 174.14 329.35
5 62.81 89.23 122.86 105.83 100.68 89.29 89.12 93.26 106.39 252.77
67 269.93 341.28 443.20 390.28 326.78 293.79 308.60 322.95 369.79 1,150.06
Total 1,987.95 2,111.54 2,731.36 2,395.63 2,534.62 2,678.16 2,869.18 3,123.29 3,670.48 5,642. 12
Source: SSB&NDRC, multiple years
Table 4. Inner Mongolia's Real GDP/GRP (100M RMB, All data are in constant 1995 prices)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 235.39 328.17 323.78 345.37 347.37 350.80 356.75 371.71 407.79 477.40
2 232.51 338.36 375.80 403.80 433.90 455.21 503.67 568.74 700.44 958.11
3 63.00 67.94 71.44 80.99 88.26 101.07 119.07 153.81 244.96 298.86
4 60.46 87.52 98.43 107.21 118.16 142.59 161.82 186.59 210.41 229.19
5 54.35 74.62 80.59 96.54 104.33 133.45 147.30 162.82 175.49 191.84
67 124.04 136.49 148.75 171.46 192.67 217.89 247.97 276.86 348.31 403.01
Total 769.75 1,033.11 1,098.79 1,205.37 1,284.69 1,401.01 1,536.57 1,720.53 2,087.40 2,558.41
Source: SSB&NDRC, multiple years
Table 5. Energy consumption in Liaoning's Material Production Sector (10,000 tonnes standard coal
equivalent based on calorific value calculation)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 128.50 147.32 145.53 144.88 148.41 143.18 148.09 145.83 144.75 151.08
2 5,938.14 5,454.32 5,540.41 5,011.22 4,759.76 5,483.66 5,251.18 5,411.11 5,837.28 6,005.13
3 45.86 40.98 68.96 64.79 64.19 65.67 68.13 68.75 73.53 77.91
4 245.12 195.10 304.37 290.10 289.98 442.32 653.91 637.74 594.25 635.94
5 61.41 67.15 49.53 51.00 54.92 58.61 62.95 66.77 69.47 99.96
67 984.55 1,056.68 1,015.11 852.90 877.94 850.21 881.23 985.58 943.30 1,140.78
Total 7,403.59 6,961.56 7,123.91 6,414.89 6,195.21 7,043.64 7,065.49 7,315.78 7,662.58 8,110.80
Source: SSB&NDRC, multiple years
Table 6. Liaoning's Real GDP/GRP (1OOM RMB, All data are in 1995 constant prices)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 347.05 478.09 474.76 523.50 520.28 503.44 544.44 596.76 612.24 739.57
2 1,207.67 1,390.71 1,533.26 1,639.11 1,793.91 2,114.89 2,190.12 2,357.89 2,542.04 2,721.37
3 162.31 159.95 172.45 188.31 205.56 229.51 250.43 280.99 340.09 428.33
4 174.31 196.20 219.13 267.88 314.17 350.46 394.50 430.14 492.81 588.88
5 312.95 394.55 428.72 525.16 575.20 631.64 696.51 768.72 798.57 860.70
67 474.38 564.84 585.37 679.60 758.39 839.12 957.08 1,084.43 1,182.10 1,263.03
Total 2,678.68 3,184.34 3,413.69 3,823.56 4,167.52 4,669.06 5,033.08 5,518.93 5,967.85 6,601.86
Source: SSB&NDRC, multiple years
Table 7. Energy consumption in Ningxia's Material Production Sector (10,000 tonnes standard coal
equivalent based on calorific value calculation)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 23.64 19.55 21.19 20.06 21.15 * * * 9.83 9.73
2 307.17 321.19 359.34 380.11 428.40 * * * 1,851.69 1,365.95
3 2.65 1.41 3.14 2.83 3.04 * * * 2.68 7.33
4 39.41 31.92 35.72 34.52 27.86 * * * 113.82 37.33
5 0.75 0.68 0.36 5.79 12.46 * * * 15.86 18.58
67 76.40 75.18 79.29 79.06 87.24 * * * 120.51 409.26
Total 450.02 449.93 499.04 522.37 580.15 * * * 2,114.40 1,848.19
*: data unavailable
Source: SSB&NDRC, multiple years
Table 8. Ningxia's Real GDP/GRP (100M RMB, All data are in constant 1995 prices)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 32.62 44.12 44.06 47.86 47.82 45.95 48.79 52.32 54.04 61.15
2 50.01 69.02 71.94 74.78 80.38 93.00 100.62 113.67 139.53 174.92
3 10.78 12.35 14.22 17.64 21.89 27.04 31.63 36.00 47.41 49.87
4 6.69 11.93 14.09 15.84 17.96 19.31 22.59 25.33 27.11 28.07
5 12.77 17.38 18.17 18.71 20.44 21.60 23.08 25.04 27.22 29.81
67 33.13 42.78 44.87 48.78 52.04 58.67 66.97 73.68 79.88 88.40
Total 146.00 197.57 207.35 223.61 240.52 265.57 293.68 326.05 375.18 432.22
Source: SSB&NDRC, multiple years
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Coal to Liquids: Why and How It Makes the Case in China
Abstract
In this study, I examine why and how coal liquefaction, or coal-to-liquids, makes its case
in China. Different from Europe and the United States, China is actively developing
coal-to-liquids technologies and projects. Different from conventional wisdom that in
China the central government mandates and guides coal liquefaction to ensure energy
security, I argue that the diversification strategy of state-owned coal companies is
another key driver for coal-liquefaction development in China, in addition to the state
interest and policy that initiated this move. Given current extensive conversation and
debate on Chinese technology innovation capability, my research sheds light on the
innovation system in China and provides implications for technology policy and
investments.
Chinese energy resources and policy justify the development of coal liquefaction, and it
was the economy and the coal industry development in the 1990s that made coal
companies pursue business diversification into coal chemicals through coal liquefaction. I
support this business-diversification argument with three cases of major coal companies
developing coal-to-liquids projects. I also highlight the implications from this technology
innovation in China: This bottom-up driving force for coal liquefaction indicates the
capability of change and innovation in the Chinese system.
1. Introduction
The People's Republic of China (China) is actively developing coal-to-liquids (CtL)
technologies. Meanwhile in Europe and the United States, these technologies have
evolved to an unfavorable stage because of the intense capital investment and economic
uncertainty caused by the volatility of crude oil prices, technological risks, and significant
carbon-dioxide discharge (Vallentin 2008a, 2008b). CtL is a process of coal liquefaction
with the action of a catalyst, and CtL includes two types of technologies: direct coal
liquefaction, DCL, which tums coal directly into liquid products, and indirect coal
liquefaction, ICL, or Fischer-Tropsch synthesis (FTS), which gasifies coal into syngas and
then produces liquids from the syngas. Originated in Germany in the 1940s to meet
urgent needs of liquid transportation fuels, CTL's peak production capacity reached 4.2
million metric tonnes per year (Mt/y) for DCL, and 0.6 Mt/y for FTS in Germany
(Dadyburjor and Liu, 2004). Then the development of coal liquefaction was largely
determined by the availability and price of petroleum. For example, in the 1950s due to
the discovery of inexpensive oil in the Middle-East, the coal liquefaction development was
essentially ceased in the world except in South Africa which lacked access to petroleum.
Currently in China there is one DCL project (the only one in the world) and five ICL
projects being developed by state-owned major coal companies, with a total annual
capacity of 2.6 million tonnes for the first stage. Developers all aim to expand production
capacity after the success of the first-stage operation, and there are more CtL projects
being planned or at the stage of feasibility studies.
Then why are CtL technologies being planned and developed with real investment and
projects in China? One well-received explanation is the energy-security policy. China has
a serious quest for energy security, especially oil for which over 50% of the consumption
relies on imports, and CtL meets this demand through converting coal, the abundant
fossil fuel in China, into oil (Sun et al. 2005; Zhang 2007; Wu 2009; Su et al. 2008;
USCEC 2009). Also, unlike Europe and the United States, China gives low priority to
carbon-dioxide (C02) mitigation, a rather favorable policy framework for CtL, which
makes CtL encounter many fewer barriers. In such an environment, CtL is advocated and
developed with other favorable conditions, including economic advantages (low CtL
capital costs), and strong CtL investors (large state-owned companies) (Vallentin and
Stuttgart 2010).
However, this type of top-down argument, i.e., national policy implemented by SOEs, can
only partially explain why CtL make its case in China: this did move CtL development at
the beginning, but could not sustain the proactive pursuit of CtL by those major
developers. A bottom-up force, for instance, from the coal companies, cannot be
overlooked when examining the development of CtL in China. National energy-security
policy, state ownership of coal majors, low capital costs, and priority of carbon regulation
provide low entry barriers for CtL, but do not constitute sufficient incentives for companies
to develop CtL projects, which demand investment of billions of Yuan and still carry
technical or financial risks. If we only consider the national policy or the will of central
government as the driver for CtL, then we miss the fact that in China, state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) are transitioning into entities that also operate in the market economy
and pursue business interests: CtL as an immature technology carries risks, unlikely to
provide return on investment within just a few years. Government mandate or interest is
not sufficiently convincing to explain the active pursuit of CtL by those SOE developers.
In this analysis, I hypothesize the following about CtL development in China: after being
initiated by the central government, CtL development in China has been largely spurred
from the bottom up: those coal majors' strategy of diversification and active pursuit for
business opportunities. Exploring and testing this hypothesis can shed light on
understanding why and how CtL can succeed in China. I also point out that, from the
perspective of technology innovation, Chinese companies play a critical role in
developing or upgrading CtL technologies. While developing CtL technologies and
projects, the developers, mainly major coal companies, benefit from the knowledge
spillovers of this advanced coal technology, and embrace the diversification into the
coal-chemical industry. This would imply that the Chinese system is capable of innovation
and change, unlike what some western analysts observed.2 Another contribution of my
research is to understand China's innovation system.
To test my hypothesis, in the following section, I introduce the CtL origin and
development in China. Then, I analyze how CtL makes its case within the technological
system intertwined with energy policy, technology innovation, and interests of parties
involved in this development. Then, I elaborate why and how those state-owned major
coal companies pursue CtL technologies as a diversification strategy in order to improve
their business, within the background of China's economy, policy, and industries in the
1990s and later. Then I further support my hypothesis regarding business diversification
with three case studies about the Shenhua Group, Yankuang Group, and Jinmei Group,
three major coal companies and CtL developers in China. In the last section, I conclude
this analysis.
2. CtL in China
Currently, South Africa and China are the only two countries developing commercial CtL
technologies and plants, although the United States and Europe have some companies
focusing on CtL research or small-scale demo plants. Since the 1950s, the South African
Coal Oil and Gas Corporation (Sasol) has been operating two commercial indirect coal
2 See Steinfeld, Lester, and Cunningham (2009) for more description regarding this pessimistic stance.
liquefaction plants, producing about 30% (150,000 barrels per day) of South Africa's
automotive fuels (Sasol 2009).
In China, CtL technology was initially charged with the mission of maturing into a strategic
technology to enhance energy/oil security, and also breeding a new 'coal liquefaction
industry', as reported in the 1990s in the 11th five-year plan for the coal industry.3 In
China, some major coal companies are CtL project developers, but the central
government provided the initial and important support for research on CtL technologies,
through the state high-tech "863" program. Governmental supports covered fundamental
research topics of DCL technology, including process development, catalysts and
kinetics, reaction engineering and reactor design and simulation, et al. (Liu, Shi, and Li
2009). In the 1990s, the State Council, after comparing three companies,4 selected
Shenhua Group, the largest coal company in the country, as the developer for the world's
first modern DCL facility, with a support of a 11-billion-Yuan "Coal Replace Oil" fund.
Since then Shenhua has been active in DCL technology research and development (R&D)
and project development.
For the indirect liquefaction, or FTS technologies, China started the research in the 1970s
through the Institute of Coal Chemistry (ICC) under the Chinese Academy of Science
(CAS). ICC focused on iron catalysts and fixed-bed reactors in 1979-1987 and
precipitated iron and fixed-bed reactors in 1986-1993. From 1995 to the early 2000s, ICC
switched research to the slurry-phase technology and operated a 750 tonnes/year plant
since then. In 2003, Yankuang Group, another major coal company in China built a 4,500
tonnes/year FTS facility using iron catalysts and a slurry reactor. ICC/CAS was the major
3 See the full-text document at http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2007-01/22/content_7694688_3.htm;
and http://info.chem.hc360.com/2007/08/03104919629-2.shtml
4 These three were: (1) Shenhua Group based in Inner Mongolia, (2) Yilan Coal Group from Heilongjiang
Province, and (3) Xianfeng Coal from Yunan Province.
carrier for fundamental FTS research. Still today, ICC remains as the major technology
provider for ICL. Synfuels China, the ICL technology company I interviewed during my
China trip, is a spin-off of the Shanxi Province ICC branch. In addition to ICC, Yankuang
Group acts as another technology developer, through Yankuang Energy Technology
Company headed by Dr. Qiwen Sun returning to China from Sasol. China Coal Research
Institute (CCRI)5 is the largest R&D institute for a broad spectrum of coal technologies. In
terms of CtL technologies, CCRI built two 0.1 tonne/day bench scale DCL plants in the
1980s. Several leading coal chemical experts from CCRI were recruited by Shenhua or
other companies to direct CtL development. CCRI still remains as the leading developer
of coal technologies.
Currently in China, there are one DCL plant and four ICL plants that are constructed and
have conducted some trial operations. The DCL plant is developed and owned by the
Shenhua Group. Four ICL plants are also owned by major state-owned coal companies in
China. The following table summarizes these CtL projects in China. Totally these plants
account for a gross capacity of 2.6 million tonnes per year (Mt/Y). However, those coal
companies all have plans for larger-capacity facilities. For instance, Shenhua Group is
planning to invest 30 billion Yuan more to expand the Erdos DCL plant capacity to 3 Mt/Y
in the coming few years. The CtL development is projected to have an investment of 400
to 500 billion Yuan by 2020, with total liquids production capacity of 50 Mt per year.
5 See CCRI website, http://www.ccri.com.cn
6 http://www.sxhgw.cn/html/5001/2008429/news_113671_9156.asp
Table 2-1: Major CtL Projects under Construction in China, December 2009
Type Owner Technology Capacity Location Trial
Developer (Phase I, Mt/Y) Operation
Shenhua 2008 &
DCL Shenhua Group Group I Erdos, Inner Mongolia 2009
Synfuels
ICL Shenhua Group China 0.18 Erdos, Inner Mongolia 2010e
Synfuels
Yitai Group China 0.16 Erdos, Inner Mongolia 2009
Synfuels
Lu'an Group China 0.16 Tunliu, Shanxi 2009
Yankuang Yankuang
Group Group 1 Yulin, Shaanxi 2009
Jincheng Coal Exxon (MTG) * 0.1 Jincheng, Shanxi 2009
Note: 1. e, estimated; 2. each company has planning for larger capacity plants following the Phase I; 3.
Shenhua, joined with Sasol, has two ICL projects in Ningxia and Shaanxi under planning. 4. There are some
small-scale demo plants or being-planned plants, described by Liu, Shi, and Li (2009), that are not on the list
for my interviews. *. Jincheng Coal Group joined with ICC (Shanxi) to modify Exxon's MTG technology to
make it suitable for its high-ash coal.
Source: interviews and multiple sources, edited by the author.
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Figure 2- 1: CtL Plants in China
Source: US-China Energy Center (USCEC) 2009
3. Why and How CtL Develops: A Technological-systems View
I examine China's CtL development within the technological-systems framework, to shed
light on why and how the govemment and SOEs in China develop CtL.
CtL is a complex system integrating the policy, technology, and business, which comprise
a technological system. A technological system is a complex and dynamic one that
consists not only of equipment, but also is shaped by social parameters, including
political, economic, and interpersonal aspects (Rogers 2003). This framework is
proposed by Hughes (1987), and Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1995), to understand the
evolution of technologies and enterprises' competence. Under this framework, a
technological system can be understood as a dynamic network of agents who interact
within a particular institutional framework or set of infrastructure and natural resources
and are involved in the generation, diffusion, and utilization of a specific technology. This
technological system approach explores technology-diffusion processes by examining
four major components: (1) energy resources that affect technology selection, (2)
institutions, i.e., those policies or regulations and related synergies or conflicts, (3)
innovation features of the technology, and (4) actors involved at this stage or in this
process.
Innovation Actors
features
Figure 2- 2: Technological-systems Approach for China's CtL Development
3.1 Energy Resources
China's energy resources portfolio can explain why Chinese government initiated the
pursuit of CtL technologies. The characteristics of the Chinese energy portfolio can be
summarized as "dependent on coal, rich in coal, while short in oil." Coal remains as the
dominant energy resource in China, accounting for around 70% of the primary energy
consumption, and around 80% of the primary energy production (both in calorific value
calculation) (NBS, 2007). Among the total proved energy reserves in China, coal
occupies a major share of 87%, compared to that of oil at 3% (Ren 2006). China started
importing oil since 1993, and the dependency on imported oil is around 50%, and it is
projected to be 60% by 2020 (NBS 2007; Ren 2006). It is under this energy mix and with
the concern of ensuring national energy security (especially oil) that the Chinese
government views coal liquefaction as a strategic technology and vows to master this
advanced coal technology as a type of "technology reserve," which can be used
whenever necessary. The State Council followed this initiative with a special-Coal
Replace Oil fund in 1981. During the late 1990s, the Chinese government compared
several state-owned coal companies and selected Shenhua Group to pursue CTL
development, which was the kick-off step for CtL development in China.
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Figure 2- 3: China Oil Production and Consumption, 1965-2009Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA), USCEC 2009
3.2 Institutions
Institutions refer to policies or regulations for CtL technologies in China. The Energy
Bureau under the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) is the state
unit charged with the power of approving or halting CtL projects, which usually incur an
investment of billions of Chinese Yuan. Specifically, the Coal Division under the Energy
Bureau has this power. It is worthwhile to note that the Energy Bureau, despite its
enormous power of regulating the energy industry and policy in China, is a unit with only
112 staff.7 The Coal Division is an office holding with three officers.8
Another governmental agency, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is also a
key driving force. MOST exerts its impact through providing financial support to research
projects under the 863 Program. MOST has an "863 Experts Committee" for Advanced
Coal Technologies, composed of some well-known or authoritative domestic scientists
who jointly determine the projects funding for CtL projects. These experts are not full-time
employees for this Committee, and they meet several times each year to select projects
to fund. In fact, some of them are the chief engineers or senior managers in the major
coal companies who are developing CtL technologies and/or projects.9
Despite the fact that the Central Government initiated the development of CtL in China,
as it moves on, the attitude of the central government gradually changed to "cautiously
supportive". According to the "1 11h five-year (2006-2010) planning of the coal industry,"
China would gradually build CtL demo plants for coal conversion and coal liquefaction.
Premier Wen Jiabao, when visiting Shenhua DCL plant in 2007, applauded this project as
an 'important part for the national energy security strategy, and also a grand scientific
7 http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2008-07/29/content 1058473.htm
8 There is no publicly available data about this number. I estimate this number, from the population of three
of an equivalent NDRC division I visited during this trip.
9 For instance, Dr. REN Xiangkun, the chief of Shenhua DCL project, is in this committee. Dr. SUN Qiwen,
the head of Yankuang ICL project, is also seated.
experiment,' but he also warned, 'it should be tried and developed gradually and
cautiously, and should not be rushed with many projects together at one time'.' 0 NDRC
believes CtL in China is still at the experimental stage carrying technological and
business risks. NDRC is regulating CtL development with caution: in September 200811 it
halted all other CtL projects except the Shenhua DCL project.
Local governments are another regulatory force that actually supports CtL development.
Ctl projects located in their territory have an investment of billions Yuan and are a
significant driver of their GDP growth, a key performance indicator for the promotion of
those officials. For instance, Shenhua's 10-billion-Yuan DCL investment in Inner
Mongolia is estimated to increase this region's GDP by 60 billion Yuan, 10% of the 609
billion Yuan GDP in 2007 for Inner Mongolia (Wu and Polenske 2009). The city
government of Erdos, Inner Mongolia, hosting Shenhua's DCL project and two ICL
projects by Shenhua and Yitai, relies on the coal-chemical industry to sustain its high
growth of GDP per capita, and vows to surpass Hong Kong by 2010 in GDP per capita.12
3.3 Innovation Features
These refer to techno-economic-environmental features of CtL with the successful
example of Sasol ICL facilities, CTL developers or research institutes argue that ICL is a
well-established technology, while DCL is relatively new and should be conducted
cautiously with demo plants (Liu, 2001).
The economics of coal liquefaction remains uncertain. For DCL, Shenhua in 2005
claimed that the cost of its DCL liquids was less than $30/barrel in 2005 (Sun et al., 2005),
10 http://info.chem.hc360.con/2007/08/03104919629-2.shtml
" Xinhua New Agency, http://en.ce.cn/National/Politics/200809/05/t20O8O9O5 16717701.shtml. Then this
ban was lifted sometime in early 2009. I will come to this later in this paper.12 http://www.zh818.conGet/redian/2009127111870.Html
but most recently this estimate was elevated to $84-85/barrel." Some experts in China
also cast doubt on the threshold of $30 per barrel, by citing the much higher coal prices
compared with several years ago. Some studies suggest that the net breakeven oil price
(BEOP) for CtL would be Euro 49-57/BBL (Vallentin 2008a, 2008b). However, for ICL,
the successful experience of Sasol seems to imply that indirect liquefaction is economic
at the stage of commercial production. For example, Yankuang Group, a coal major and
strong advocate for CtL, estimates their cost of ICL is 2,047 Yuan per tonne, equivalent to
$27/barrel, based on 2006 data. If the coal price is 600 Yuan/tonne about the current
level, then it would translate into $51/tonne for ICL liquid products, assuming other costs
remain same. Such estimates can largely depend on the price: coal companies can adopt
production costs instead of the market price of coal, thus the breakeven costs would be
much lower, which makes CtL much more economic.
Table 2- 2: Yankuang ICL Costs Estimates
Materials Unit input (tonne) Unit price (Yuan) Costs
Raw coal 4.1 150 615
Steam 2.5 120 300
Water 12 1.2 14
Depreciation 750
Others 368
Total 2,047
Source: SYWG Research and Consulting, 2006
The high discharge of carbon dioxide is another feature of CtL projects, as discussed
previously. But Chinese developers are aware of this concern, and are working to capture
the relatively high-concentration C02 flow from CtL plants. For instance, Shenhua Group
is conducting feasibility research with West Virginia University for the carbon capture and
storage for its DCL plant in Erdos. For regular pollution other than C02, Chinese
developers believe it is not a major concern or there is not much pollution due to their
" Dr. ZHANG Yuzhuo, CEO of Shenhua Group, see http://energy.people.com.cn/GB/l 1419714.html
environmental control measurements. When it comes to local environmental impact
caused by facilities construction, some developers disagree with the conventional idea
that their projects destroy the local environmental system. Instead, they believe they
improve the local environment through providing funds for planting trees or improving the
14infrastructure
CtL is also water-intensive. For example, Yitai project use 12 tonnes of water for each
tonne of final liquid products15 . China's CtL projects are currently all located in those
water-scarce regions: Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and Shaanxi. CtL developers I interviewed
all acknowledge this issue, but they disagree with those critiques for three reasons: first
and the most important, CtL water intensity is not higher compared with other chemical
projects such as fertilizer projects which are not so intensively criticized; two, they pay
close attention to water recycling and conservation to minimize the water consumption;
and three, the water sources planning for current projects were conducted and all went
through the approval process of governmental agencies.
3.4 Actors
Actors are those parties who participate in the CtL development in China. Current CtL
developers are the main actors in this CtL movement. They are major state-owned coal
companies, or CtL technologies providers, such as Shenhua, Lu'an, Yankuang (YETC),
Jincheng Coal Group, and Synfuels China.
During developing CtL, these major players include a group of marginal players, such as
Sosal and Shell who have some proposed joint-venture CtL projects with Chinese
counterparties, and some other coal companies who are considering the entry into the
14 From interviews in November 2009.
" See http://energy.people.com.cn/GB/11419714.html
CtL playfield. These marginal players are watching the progress of current projects, and
might enter the field when the technologies mature and the policies become clear.
CtL developers also include another group of institutions, such as a significant number of
domestic or international, (1) universities or research institutes, including CCRI, CAS,
chemical engineering departments or institutes in Tsinghua, Nanjing, and Zhejiang
Universities and many others; (2) design, engineering, and manufacturing firms who work
as suppliers to major CtL developers; and (3) oil companies from which CtL developers
recruit refinery or chemical engineers for their CtL operation. These players are
assembled by the major CtL developers throughout the projects, for technologies
R&D, engineering construction, and facilities operation and management.
There is another group who objects or remains skeptical about the CtL development in
China. These include, for example, scholars or scientists who are not convinced of the
necessity and feasibility of CtL projects in China, and environmental organizations
concerned about the pollution from CtL. Despite their different voices, they are not in fact
a strong force halting the CtL development, given the supportive attitude from the central
and local government, as well as the strong advocacy of SOE CtL developers.
As discussed above, the structure of energy supply, and the supportive attitude and
efforts of the central government launched the CtL movement in China. The state interest
of establishing a coal-liquefaction industry in the future, and no rigid regulatory
carbon-emissions regulation make CtL development allowed and less challenged by
regulation in this country. However, why do those major coal companies, i.e., those CtL
developers in China, strongly support this CtL development? Is it only because as SOEs,
they implement the national policy? I explore the incentives of these SOEs in the next
section. The incentives of these SOEs to advocate for CtL are critical to understand why
and how CtL makes its case in China.
4. Actors: Why and How SOEs Develop CtL
It is true that at the beginning some state-owned coal companies were encouraged or
directed by the central government to develop CtL. For instance, The Chinese State
Council provided 11 billion Yuan (about $1.3 billion US Dollars) from the
"Coal-Replace-Oil" fund to Shenhua to initiate CTL development in January 1998. Since
then, Shenhua has developed a business strategy, and it began CTL development in
northwestern China's major coal production areas. However, the government did not
allocate funding for other companies to develop capital-intensive CtL technologies and
projects. Then, why did several other enterprises, together with Shenhua Group, become
advocates for this CtL development? For example, these companies seek to lobby NDRC
to approve their projects after the NDRC hatted their development due to "technological
and business risks" in 2008.
I argue that it is the diversification strategy that motivated those coal companies in the
late 1990s to develop CtL, which could extend their industrial chains into coal-chemicals,
a significant profit growth source. To highlight the diversification strategy of coal
companies, I start with reviewing the situation of the coal industry and the economy
during that period. Under this economic situation, diversification became a viable
business strategy for the coal industry.
4.1 Coal Producers in China: Decline During the 1990s
Before the 1980s, under the planned economy and priority strategy of heavy industries,
coal output, a symbol of strength of a new communist nation, grew rapidly from 66 million
16 from personal interviews with Yankuang Group during the winter of 2009 in China
tonnes in 1952 to 636 million tonnes in 1979, an annual growth rate of 9% (Wang 2007).
This significant output growth still could not meet the national demand. The central
government decided to ease the entry for coal producers and encourage small mines:
local government, collective, and private-owned coal mines were allowed and flourished.
This policy effectively boosted coal output after 1980, until coal production became
oversupplied toward the end of the 1980s (Figure 2-4 and 2-5).
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Figure 2- 5: Coal Production-consumption Gap in China, 1981-2009
Source: BP 2010
Then, in the 1990s, the output of coal declined. Coal was oversupplied and there was
excessive competition among coal producers, which extended into the 1990s. The central
government initiated the policy of "closing small mines, and limiting output" to bring down
the coal production. China's economy was overheated in the early 1990s: GDP growth in
1992 reached a record high at 14.2%. The central govemment started a restrictive
monetary and fiscal policy during 1993 and 1996 (Hu 2007). This macroeconomic control
achieved the "soft-landing" for the economy: the consumer price index decreased from
24% in 1994 to 8.3% in 1996, and the GDP growth decelerated to 13.5% in 1993, and
then to 9.6% in 1996. Coal demand also decreased after 1996, and hit the trough during
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998.
Coal producers also faced unfavorable low coal prices during the 1980s and 1990s.
Although the dual-track pricing policy was introduced in 1985, which allowed a higher
coal price for output above the given quota, the low-price for coal output within the given
quota still reduced the sector's profitability. After 1994, the govemment decided to lift
price controls, but also removed the subsidy, and the govemment also imposed a higher
tax rate on coal producers, from a 3% sales tax to a 13% value-added tax. Meanwhile,
the restrictive macroeconomic policy also translated into a shrinking coal demand. Given
these, and also due to low efficiency, overstaffing, high expenses for welfare, and a fierce
competition from small mines, state-owned coal mines or companies had a significant
loss for a long period through the late 1980s and 1990s (Table 2-3, Wang 2007).
1 Case study on Yankuang Group, see http://www.yygpzx.com/gzpd/jxzyg/dl/1/21/1/kzzl.htn
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Figure 2- 6: China GDP Growth, 1994-2010
Source: TrandingEconomics, NBS
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Figure 2- 7: China Inflation Rates, 1995-2010
Source: TrandingEconomics, NBS
Figure 2- 8: Coal Price in China, 1998-2010
Note: based on 5500kcaVkg Shanxi coal, FOB price at Qinghuangdao Port;
Source: China Coal Resource Net, http://www.sxcoal.com
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Table 2- 3: Comparison of Profits: Coal vs. Electricity
Year Total profits (billion yuan)
Coal industry Electricity industr)
1980 1033 5.341
1985 -3.652 6.624
1990 -6146 7,341
1991 -6.216 8.739
1992 -5.336 10.793
1993 -1.376 13.064
1994 -0.542 18.357
1995 2.345 12.833
1996 2.293 21.804
1997 3.481 17.669
1998 -0,426 32.838
1999 -1.810 30.515
2000 0.05 45-716
2001 4.183 52.997
2002 5.388 50.825
2003 14.007 69.926
2004 30.692 70817
2005 56.100 115.773
Source: Wang 2007; China Statistical Yearbook 1981-2006
4.2 Diversification Strategies in the Late 1990s
Although most coal producers reported a loss during the 1990s31, some public coal
companies witnessed a relatively strong performance by implementing a diversification
strategy. For instance, the seven listed coal companies (Table 2-4) had positive earnings
per share during 1999 despite some decrease in revenue due to the macroeconomic
environment, and their average earnings per share (EPS) was 0.127 Yuan, above the
average of Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges. Hu and Hao (2000) examined this
phenomenon and identified the strategy of diversification as the key driver for this strong
performance. For example, Lanhua Kechuang acquired four fertilizer and chemical plants,
and also invested in some biotech companies.
18 About 80% of coal companies had a loss during this period (Hu and Hao 2000)
Table 2- 4: Performance of Some Coal Companies, 1999
Company Ticker EPS (Chinese Revenue growth for Profit growth for Net profitYuan) main business, % main business, % growth, %
Shenhuo Limited 933 0.1339 12 13 32
Jinniu Energy 937 0.1329 -7 -6 7
Zhengzhou Coal&Electrcity 600121 0.1399 16 19 19
Lan hua Kechuang 600123 0.12 20 -10 30
Yanzhou Coal 600188 0.13 -6 2 32
Tongbao Energy 600780 0.128 -20 21 22
Yitai Coal (B share) 900948 0.1018 -10 -71 -60
Source: Hu and Hao 2000
Table 2- 5: New Assets Invested during 1998-1999
Company Coal Coal-related assets Assets non-related to coal
Shenhuo Uited 4 coal mines I power plart; retrofit a railway line Alurium factory
Jnniu Energy 4 coal mines
Zhengzhou Coal&Electdciy 1 coal mine Expanding a power plant Machinery
Lanhua Kechuang 4 coal mines 4 fertilizer/chermical plants Biotech companies
Yanzhou Coal 1 coal mine Yanzhou-Shjiazhuang railway line rr industry
Tongbao Energy 1 power plant Airlines
Yitai Coal (B share) 1 coal mine Highway Hotel, shipping
Source: Hu and Hao 2000
During the 1990s when coal producers faced an unfavorable economic environment,
diversification became a strategy which could improve or sustain their business. In line
with this trend, the CtL developers also explored the opportunities to diversify their
business. In the following section, I examine the CtL initiatives of three coal companies:
Shenhua Group, Yankuang Group, and Jincheng Coal Group, based on interviews from
my trips to China and literature.
4.3 Case Studies: CtL as A Diversification Strategy
To test my hypothesis about this bottom up driver for CtL in China, I interviewed Shenhua,
Yankuang, and Jinmei, three major CtL developers in China. I have come to find that my
findings support this hypothesis:
- Shenhua views DCL, which was originally a 'political' task assigned by the central
government, as an opportunity of expanding into the coal chemical industry, and is
also pursuing ICL development, to diversify into the coal chemical industry;
- Yankuang, stated explicitly their business strategy of CtL development, and moved
with real project development;
- Jinmei, diversified into CtL amid the 1990's market, and based on their coal
reserves portfolio.
In the following sections I explore in greater details how these coal majors started their
CtL development and their related business strategies.
Shenhua Group
Shenhua Group is the only DCL project developer in China, and is also developing ICL
project in Inner Mongolia. Originally picked and assigned by the central government with
the charge of DLC development, Shenhua later viewed this development as an
opportunity of diversifying and expanding its business and improve the company's
performance. In this context, I argue that the business diversification strategy plays a key
role in Shenhua's pursuit of coal liquefaction.
Shenhua was incorporated in 1995 during the "depressing" time for the coal industry, as
the largest coal company in China, and also a key Central SOE, with integrated business
of coal, power, railway, port, shipping, coal to liquids and coal to chemicals.19 By the end
of 2009, the Shenhua Group has a total of 37 wholly-owned and shareholding
subsidiaries, with 163,745 employees and total assets of 530 billion Yuan. The Group's
operation revenue reached 161.2 Billion Yuan with the top net income among the
companies under the supervision of the Central Government. In 2010, Shenhua Group
was ranked 356th in global Fortune 500. The following table summarizes Shenhua
'9 Shenhua Group, http://www.shenhuagroup.com.cn/english/aboutus/profile0of0shenhua/index.shtml
Group's operational performance for the first half of 2010 and organizational structure.
China Shenhua Energy Company Limited (China Shenhua) is the listed subsidiary (listed
in both Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges) and the main body of Shenhua
Group, with total revenue of 121 billion Yuan in 2009 (Table 2-6).
Table 2- 6: Shenhua Group Operational Performance
January - June 2010 January - June 2009 Year-on-year growth
I
Output of raw coal
(Mt) 172.6 163.5 5.5%
Export of coal
(Mt) 5.9 6.1 -3.1%
Raw coal productivity
(ton/manshift) 23.5 21.9 7.3%
K
Power output
(billion kw/h) 76.4 49.7 53.6%
Power sales
(billion kw/h) 71.3 46.0 55.0%
IX
Cargo turnover volume
(Mt/km) 73,668.3 67,835.5 8.6%
17
Port through put (Mt/kin) 58.0 51.9 11.7%
Note: Mt, million tones; kw/h, kilo-watts per hour, Mt/km, million tones per kilometer
Source: Shenhua Group
Shenhua's diversification in the late 1990s was largely attributed to the political
connection of its top leadership (Table 2-7), especially Mr. Qing Ye, with presidency from
1998 to 2003. Mr. Ye brought to Shenhua a fund of 20 billion Yuan, the "Coal Replace
Oil" fund from the State Council when he took the presidency in 1998.20 This fund was
initially approved by then-Premier Peng Li in 1995 when Ye and Li discussed Shenhua's
high debt rate: 87%. Mr. Ye used this fund for two purposes: buying four power plants
(incorporated into Guohua Power Company, the flagship firm of Shenhua's electricity
business), and developing DCL technologies. The former was to expand the market for
coal during that coal depression - a vertical diversification, and the later was to
20 Shenhua Miracle: the story of YE Qing, see
http://finance.sina.com.cn/leadership/crz/20050420/10201533998.shtml
implement the "assignment" from the State Council to enhance national energy security,
and also generate another revenue source - also a strategy of diversification.
Table 2- 7: Shenhua Leaderships
Preside nt Term Prior position
Han Xiao 1995-1998 Vice Minister, Ministry of Coal Industry (not existing now)
Qing Ye 1998-2003 Deputy Director, State Planning Commission (former NDRC)
Biting Chen 2003-2008 Vice Governor, Jiangsu Province
Xiwu Zh ang 2009-present CEO, Shenhua Group
Source: Company website
The development of DCL technologies provided Shenhua with a unique opportunity to
practice and improve advanced coal technology innovation and managerial and business
experience. China Shenhua Coal to Liquid Company (CSCLC) is the subsidiary charged
with CtL development and coal chemicals.21 Currently, CSCLS is developing the DCL
project in Erdos, Inner Mongolia and has twice put its 1 Mt/Y DCL plant into successful
trial operation at the end of 2008 and the middle of 2009. The DCL technology
development took a long time. In early 2001, after finding the DCL technology licensed
from HTI an US-based company, unsuitable to be scaled up, Shenhua adopted the
design of HTI facilities, but started from scratch for key technology development, such as
catalysts, engineering integration, and operation. They recruited top experts from CCRI
who later led the whole DCL project in Inner Mongolia, they attracted talents from
refineries in oil companies including PetroChina and SinoPec22, and they assembled a
team with technicians from industrial design institutes, engineering integration companies,
and those coal chemical experts. CSCLC can send new employees for on-site training.
Through developing their own DCL technology and catalyst, both of which are patented,
and through assembling an R&D team, project design, engineering construction and
managing teams from various industries and companies, Shenhua has established a
21 http://company.zhaopinaconP9/CC1201/3278/CC120132783.htm
22 PetroChina and SinoPec are two major state-owned oil and gas companies in China.
team for the whole DCL process, and, more importantly, they host a pool of top coal
chemical scientists in the country. Shenhua is also planning a CCS demonstration project
at the Erdos DCL Plant, which is a good example for spillovers from DCL development:
benefiting CCS technology. By the end of 2009 the project feasibility study and the
process simulation test were completed. Their short-term objective is to erect the CCS
demonstration facility and accomplish an annual CO2 storage capacity of 100,000 tons.
The future development trend of DCL technology is to be combined with the CCS
technology so as to accomplish near-zero emission of CO22. The Shenhua CCS study is
conducted by West Virginia University under the support of a joint fund by the US
Department of Energy (DOE) and NDRC.
Shenhua conducts CtL development as a business, not a political assignment. For
instance, to hedge the risk from the project failure, in 2005 Shenhua Group purchased
insurance with a compensation value of 7.5 billion Yuan for its 10-billion-Yuan Erdos DCL
Project, from a consortium of four major properties' insurance companies in China.
Also, they are planning to sell this project to China Shenhua Energy Company Limited,
the listed sister company under the Group, once the plant can be operated stably for
commercial production.25 This implies a way of recouping their investment costs and
hedging the business and technological risks.
In addition to DCL, Shenhua also develops ICL projects, as described in Table 2-1.
Shenhua contracted Synfuels China as ICL technology developer. Unlike in the case of
DCL, Shenhua as a coal company considers herself as an ICL technology user, not a
technology developer: they are interested in final products from ICL, not the technology
23 http://www.nae.edu/Programs/FOE/CAFOE/page2009l2230/InformationforAttendees/16084/16359.aspx
24 http://www.imc.org.cni/Article/Catalog2/12749.html
25 See CSEC 2008 annual report and press conference at
http://www.csec.com/htmlen/investor/page_3_7_1.html
itself.26 This further confirmed their interest of business diversification into coal chemical
products and the market, through both practices in DCL and ICL.
Yangkuang Group
Yankuang Group Corporation, Ltd. has explicitly stated their business diversification
strategy into coal liquefaction. Their recent moves and the information I received during
the interviews with Yankuang's CtL arm confirmed this diversification strategy.
Yankuang is an SOE mainly engaged in coal mining and sales, coal chemical industry,
power generation and aluminum production, and machinery manufacturing. It was
restructured into a sole State-owned company in 1996, and further developed into
Yankuang Group Co., Ltd. in 1999. In 2009, Yankuang was ranked 12 1st among China's
Top 500 Enterprises, with total assets of 70 billion Yuan and 93,000 employees. The total
revenue in 2009 was 40.8 billion Yuan, with 20% from coal chemicals, and 53% from coal
mining and sales.27 Its main subsidiary and listed arm, Yanzhou Coal Mining Company
Limited, had total revenue of 26 billion Yuan in 2008, a 57% growth from 2007.28
Yankuang started to plan for diversification into non-coal industries or the third industry
early in 1993, but not until 1999 Yankuang took the first step of diversification into coal
chemicals by acquiring Lunan Fertilizer Factory.29 Lunan Fertilizer has a 40-year history
and kept a strong R&D force and technicians. Yankuang invested 200 million Yuan more
after this acquisition for restructuring and achieved the successful turnaround in 2001.
This factory then provided a group of technicians for Yankuang's ICL projects.
26Frmr2Fm my interview with Dr. REN Xiangkun, president of CSCLC, Shenhua, in November 2010.
2 Caijing, http://www.caijing.com.cn/2010-08-26/110505978.html
28 From the company annual report 2009
29 Xinhua News Net, 2002
Yankuang develops CtL technologies and projects to enhance its strategy of
diversification into the coal liquefaction industry, according to the Group's statement.
Yankuang's pursuit of CtL started in the early 2000s when Dr. Qiwen Sun, a former
Sasoal chief engineer joined the company and established Yankuang Energy Technology
Company (YETC),30 a technology R&D firm focusing on ICL technologies. YETC has
another label "the State Key Laboratory for Coal Liquefaction and Coal Chemicals," which
means it has high quality and is eligibile for receiving state funding and conducting
technology research and development. 31 As a State Key Lab, YETC has priority of
receiving R&D funding from the government under State High-tech Development
Program (863 Program). The name of the State Key Lab also indicates a prestigious
status as a R&D institute in China.
Dr. Sun is the technology leader and architect of Yankuang's coal-liquefaction initiative.
With a contract with Sasol for not using Sasol technologies, especially catalysts for
Yankuang, he assembled a team of 40 scientists, from top universities and local chemical
institute branches under CAS in Shanghai and Nanjing, and developed their own ICL
technologies from scratch in two years. He also relied on technicians from Lunan
Fertilizer Factory who have operational experience of coal chemicals, and some of these
people then became core technicians for ICL facilities. YETC is taking the advantage of
the status of the state key laboratory to enhance their R&D capability, through
undertaking R&D projects, both intemally from Yankuang Group, and externally from
MOST. Currently, Yankuang's ICL project has a capacity of 1 MT/y and an investment of
10 billion Yuan,, much larger than other ICL projects developed by Synfuels China, of
less than 0.2MT/Y, as shown in the table previously.
30 http://www.haoqiantu.cn/CJ783340.html
31 Detailed information regarding funding seemed sensitive and I have no data.
32 Since website, http://fmance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20080914/06245304328.shtml
This company retains an ambitious CtL development plan. In addition to the current ICL
project in Yulin, Shaanxi Province, the company is also investigating the opportunity of
coal liquefaction projects in Xinjiang Province. Similar to Shenhua projects, these CtL
projects, according to the Yankuang Group, could be injected into their listed arm
Yanzhou Coal, which just acquired Felix Resources an Australian coal company at a
price of 3.5 billion Australian dollars.as This Felix deal was valued at 5.9 billion Yuan to
acquire 100% of the stake of the target. According to Mr. WANG Xin, the President of
Yankuang, "This deal is a key step for Yankuang's R&D for clean coal technologies", to
expand into the downstream products, as Felix owns a patented "Super clean coal
technology," which can improve the combustion efficiency of coal.
Yankuang's proactive move and ambition for CtL have made the company not a passive
command-taken SOE or CtL developer, but a skillful lobbyist. In September 2008, NDRC
halted some coal liquefaction projects including Yankuang's Yulin project. In addition
mobilizing their Beijing Office to communicate with the Energy Bureau under NDRC,
Yankuang organized workshops or conferences with attendance of CAS Academicians in
the field of coal science who support CtL development,34 and policy makers from the
State Council: they aimed to exert the influence on policy makers through the voice of
supportive experts. In addition, the Chairman of Board of the Group, Mr. Jiahuai Geng, is
a representative of the People's Congress and also has the opportunity to lobby for his
company. For example, in the 2010 People's Congress, he requested NDRC to approve
Yankuang's 1 Mt/year project in Yulin.as
1 http://www.chinaknowledge.conFinance/StockChart.aspx?Type=Shanghai&StockCode=600188; Also
see http://www.xuamnei5.com
3 Academicians are CAS fellows who are regarded as authoritative experts in certain scientific fields.
" Yankuang news, http://www.ykjt.cn/xwsx/text/2010-03/08/content_247460.htmn
Jinmei Group
Jincheng Anthracite Mining Group (Jinmei Group) is another CtL developer, in Shanxi
Province. Jinmei's pursuit of CtL originated from their portfolio of coal reserves, and the
company further enforced their plan of pursuing CtL amid the market in the 1990s. They
have established their Methanol-to-gasoline (MTG) plant to convert coal into methanol
and then gasoline, and have a plan of improving the capacity in the future.
Founded in 1958, Shanxi Jincheng is a state-owned enterprise with total assets of 100
billion Yuan (as of 2010), revenue of 62.3 billion Yuan, and over 110,000 employees.
Jinmei is ranked as No. 9 out of the top 100 coal companies in China in 2010, and No.
106 out of the top 500 enterprises in China. Jinmei is comprised of six business segments:
coal, coal-bed methane, electricity, coal chemicals, coal mechanicals, and miscellaneous
operations.3" Coal chemicals are an important industry where Jinmei has invested and
achieved significant development. This segment is centered around the clean coal
technologies utilizing high sulfur, high ash, and high ask-melting point (three Highs) coal,
which is abundant in Jingmei's coal mines.
For the segment of coal chemicals, Jinmei has invested a total capital of over 1.2 billion
Yuan, holding stakes in 10 chemical companies, with annual ammonia production about
4 million tonnes. In Jinmei's 12th five-year plan, in 2015, Jinmei will have annual
production of 1 million tonnes of syn-fuel, and an ammonia production of 20 million
tonnes. This goal indicates Jinmei's ambition in developing its coal chemical industry,
including CtL (1 million tonnes of syn-fuel from coal by 2015).
36 The company website, http://www.jccoal.com
Jinmei initiated the move for coal chemicals as a business diversification strategy, based
on their resource structure and the market situation in 1990s.37 In the later 1990s when
the coal price was low in a depressing market (as discussed previously), Jinmei
management was considering strategies to improve their performance by diversifying into
the coal chemicals. Jinmei, due to their resource base of anthracite coal, did not have an
advantage in utilizing pulverized coal, thus they decided to explore the usage of
anthracite. They also had a good connection with Shanxi Institute of Coal Chemistry
(SICC) a branch of CAS, which had yet to test, but was interested, in testing their
gasification technology with anthracite coal. Based on these, Jinmei's decision then was
to move into the coal chemicals industry by taking advantage of the abundance of raw
materials, No. 9 and 15 anthracite coal.
No. 9 and 15 anthracite coal are high in sulfur, ash, and has a high ask-melting point.38
There are 4.2 billion tonnes of resource reserves of No. 15 anthracite in Jincheng
metropolitan area. In addition to this abundance, this type of low-grade anthracite is well
preserved deep underground, and the thickness of the coal bed (1.5-2.5 meters) is
suitable for mining operations, and also suitable for immediate mining as the
infrastructure already exists in those mining areas.
Jinmei adopted a two-stage way, different from Shenhua or Yankuang, to develop their
CtL project: using coal-gasification technology from SICC to produce syngas which can
be converted into methanol, then adopting MTG technology by licensing from Uhde
Gmbh (one of the largest chemical engineering company in the world, in Germany) to
produce liquids from methanol. Since 2003, Jinmei, set up a joint-venture company,
3 From interviewing Jimnei management, in charge of Ctl/MTG and coal chemicals business segment
31 Sulfur content 2.4-3.6%, ash 22-35%, and melting point higher than 1500'C; in contrast, No.3
anthracite is a high grade coal and flagship coal product of Jinmei Group. Source:
http://www.hgjob.com/resume/uti/183967.html
Tianhe Co. Ltd., with SICC, to test SICC Pressured Ash Agglomerating Fluidized Bed
Coal Gasification Technology (AFB), which is suitable for various types of coal and for
being localized with its lower cost compared to gasification technologies by Shell and
Chevron-Texaco.39 In 2006, the coal-based syn-fuel project was erected with a target
capacity of 100,000 tonnes/year, and was selected as a key project by the Eleventh
Five-year Plan of Shanxi Province. Jinmei invested 2.3 billion Yuan in this project,
adopting AFB and MTG technologies. In 2008, Tianxi Coal to Liquids Company was
established from Jinmei Group to specialize in Jinmei's CtL development. According to
the project description, this factory can produce 100,000 tonnes of Euro 3 standard
gasoline, 13,000 tonnes of LPG, and 16,000 tonnes of sulfur. It can also be adjusted to
produce 300,000 tonnes of high grade methanol (the interim product for the whole CtL
chain). The annual revenue from products is estimated at 700 million Yuan.40 This
flexibility of products reflects the risk-hedging strategy Jinmei is using: their
technology/facilities allow the switch to methanol production if the CtL production is not
economical or technologically feasible.
Jinmei mobilized internal and external resources to ensure the progress of the CtL project.
When SICC tested the AFB technology, Jinmei utilized the industrial boilers from its
subsidiary, Jinshi Chemical Fertilizer Company for the interim experiments. Staff for this
gasification process development came mainly from SICC and Jinmei intemally. After
Jinmei licensed MTG technology from Uhde, Uhde sent engineers to Jincheng City to
direct the installation and set-ups. The design and construction were outsourced to the
Third Design Institute of China Chemcial Engineering, a top institute in chemical
engineering design and construction in China. Meanwhile, Jinmei solicited over 40
experienced engineers from Jinju Chemical Fertilizer Company in Zhejiang Provinces, a
39 See http://www.hgjob.com/resume/util/183967.htmI
40 Introductory material by Tianxi CtL Company
subsidiary of Jinmei to be trained on spot in MTG facilities. These employees were
assigned a three-year contract, and they became the core group of operating the MTG
operation.
In summary, Jinmei determined to diversify into the coal chemical business through CtL,
after analyzing the market situation and their resource portfolio, and since then they took
efforts and succeeded in building their MTG project. Meanwhile, according to my
interview, Jinmei management view Jinmei as a CtL technology user, instead of an
technology owner. They adopted or licensed these technologies and put them into use for
their CtL projects. Currently, the Jinmei CtL project is the only one in the world that uses
MTG technology to produce oil liquids from coal. The project went through an
experimental operation and was reported to be under 'stable' running in March 2010.41
4.4. Summary: CtL for Business Diversification
China's energy structure and the central government's policy initiated the CtL
development in China. However, afterwards, it is the coal majors' proactive plans for
business diversification that drove CtL projects in China. The Central government
assigned financial resources to the Shenhua Group to develop the only DCL project; but
Shenhua also pursued ICL projects with the intent to conduct business in coal chemicals.
Jinmei's ambition in CtL was driven by the structure of their coal reserves: their large
low-grade coal resources makes good economic sense for them to develop CtL projects
in order to diversify into coal chemicals. Yankuang is also pursing CtLto expand into coal
chemical business segment, as demonstrated in the three cases above.
Then, why do they choose CtL or coal chemicals instead of other business as a segment
into which to diversify? CtL can grant them a competitive advantage over competitors,
41 See http://www.coalchina.org.cn/page/info.jsp?id=18262
and there is always enough market for CtL products, especially oil. The major coal
companies, in addition to conventional coal production and sales, they can diversify into
related sectors including power generation, transportation (railway and ports, for
example), mining services, or miscellaneous sectors, such as real estates etc. However,
these sectors are either already very competitive or are sectors in which they do not have
a niche (for example power generation), or where almost any other company can enter
without difficulty (real estate, mining services, etc.). CtL, due to its intensive capital costs
and technology know-how, can only be pursued by companies who have sufficient
financial, technical, and natural resources, such as the large state-owned coal companies.
Given China's need for domestic oil and with over 50% of their oil being imported, CtL
products can always be absorbed by the domestic market, if not by the international
market. Therefore, for coal majors who own abundant coal reserves and believe in
China's continuous surging demand for oil, expanding into CtL constitutes a meaningful
business strategy.
As discussed in the cases above, these coal majors position themselves as users,
instead of developers or owners, of these advanced CtL technologies (except Shenhua
for DCL, which was "assigned" by the central government), although some of them do
keep their CtL R&D force. In this context, although CtL is a complicated technological
system, the technology has not constituted a serious barrier for the coal majors to
develop CtL projects. For example, Jinmei Group joined forces or licensed external
technologies and modified them to develop their CtL projects. The Shenhua Group (for
their ICL project in Inner Mongolia) and the Lu'an Coal Group, another coal major in
China, both contracted Synfuel China, a CtL technology company and a spin-off from
SICC and headed by Dr. Yongwang Li another top CtL expert in China, to develop their
ICL projects. Yankuang Group, different from Jinmei or Lu'an, does have their own R&D
force headed by Dr. Qiwen Sun, a former engineer with Sasol. However, Dr. Sun, based
on his years' experience in Sasol, could assemble the team and establish the lab for
Yankuang in a relatively short time, which as well did not pose a significant technological
challenge for the company's venture into CtL. Thus, the complexity of the CtL
technological system is not a barrier for these coal majors' development of CtL projects.
Being technology users does not mean that these coal majors can outsource CtL projects
and get oil to foreign countries, which is not feasible. Outsourcing is not feasible in many
ways, at least in the near term. First the energy-security concern determines that
outsourcing whole CtL projects overseas is not politically viable. From the point of view of
the Chinese government, CtL meets the energy security concem by its capability of
supplying oil from within China: outsourcing those projects diverts from this strategy.
Second, outsourcing such large-scale projects is unlikely to be economically feasible. CtL
projects involve not only sophisticated technologies, intensive capital, infrastructure, and
engineering issues, but also a sufficient and stable supply of coal as a raw material, as
well as support from the local government. It would become extremely challenging or
costly to meet these requirements in a foreign country. In other words, developing these
projects within China is a more economical and politically feasible way than outsourcing
projects to other countries. Instead, CtL technology developer, Synfuel China, in addition
to developing domestic projects for Shenhua and other coal majors, is starting to explore
business opportunities overseas to apply its technology. Dr. Yongwang Li, the CEO of
Synfuel China, informed me in November 2010 that they were in talks with an Indian coal
company that was seeking CtL projects in India through using Synfuel CtL technologies.
Therefore, those majors choose CtL to diversify their business, not because of any
command from the central government, but because they viewed CtL as a business
opportunity. Shenhua Group started their DCL project with the governmental funding, and
continued with investment in ICL as they viewed these as business opportunities.
Yankuang Group pursues CtL proactively as their diversification strategy. Jinmei Group,
based on their resource portfolio, determined to enter the coal chemical industry through
CtL development, and successfully built their MTG project. These three cases, therefore,
support my hypothesis that CtL is driven from the bottom up. Meanwhile, during my
interviews with these companies, I also find that these coal majors benefit from
knowledge spillovers from these large- scale projects, for example, by expanding their
industrial network and improving their managerial experience. Domestically, they
collaborate with various companies or organizations to establish their projects.
Intemationally, these coal majors interact with companies and research institutes, in
supplies, research, and joint ventures for companies in China. For instance, Shenhua
Group has joint ventures with European companies who are also their suppliers for DCL
projects." Shenhua is also working extensively with West Virginia University on coal
chemical research, carbon capture and storage, and economic analysis. Managing
projects with an investment of billions of dollars involves significant organizational
structure and helps build up the project management capability of those developers and
improve their managerial experience.
5. Conclusion
China's energy structure, emphasis on energy security, and low priority for carbon
regulation, make it feasible for the diffusion of CtL technologies. To explore the drivers for
CtL in China, I proposed the hypothesis that, after being initiated by the central
government, the key driver for CtL development in China is the business diversification
strategy of major coal companies.
42 From the interview with Shenhua. But detailed infonnation regarding what these joint-ventures are and
how they operate were not disclosed.
I argue that, the low coal price, poor market performance, and reform of the coal and
electricity sectors in the 1990s motivated coal companies to diversify in order to cope with
competition and to improve their business performance. Coal companies perceive CtL as
a value-adding business as they diversify into coal chemicals, given China's growing
demand of oil and chemicals from rapid economic growth. Shenhua, Yankuang, and
Jinmei, three coal majors in China, all decided to move into the CtL field, with the
purposes of diversifying their business, as I demonstrated in the case studies.
Although these CtL developers view themselves as technology users, they still maintain
internal technology R&D force, in order to master some industrial know-how, and keep
some competitive advantage. Therefore, technology innovation is also an inherent part of
this CtL development. Shenhua and Yankuang both have their technology focused on
CtL in order to keep their competency in this industry. Shenhua, Yankuang and Jinmei,
through CtL projects, have enhanced their R&D capability, extended their industrial chain
and network, and improved managerial and business development experience. Chinese
SOEs know how to innovate and change, and pursue their business interest. This
indicates that the Chinese system is now capable of innovation and change, contrary to
what some westem observers thought.
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The Impact of Future Carbon Prices on CCS Investment
for PC and IGCC Power Plants in China
Abstract
In this study, I answer two related questions about the development of carbon capture
and storage CCS and power generation technologies in China: (1) what is the breakeven
carbon-dioxide price to justify CCS installation investment for Integrated Gasification
Combined Cycle (IGCC) and pulverized coal (PC) power plants, and (2) what are the
risks associated with investment for CCS. To answer these questions, I build a net
present value model for IGCC and PC plants with capacity of 600MW, with assumptions
best representing the current technologies in China. Then, I run a sensitivity analysis of
capital costs and fuel costs to reveal their impact on the carbon price, and analyze the
risk on investment retum caused by the carbon price volatility. My study shows that in
China, a breakeven carbon price of $61/tonne is required to justify investment on CCS for
PC plants, and $72/tonne for IGCC plants. In this analysis, I also advise investors on the
impact of capital and fuel costs on the carbon price and suggest optimal timing for CCS
investment.
1. Introduction
Relying on coal-fueled power plants to meet the growing demand for electricity and facing
the pressure of reducing carbon-dioxide (CO2) emissions, the People's Republic of China
(China) is actively pursuing advanced electricity generation technologies. In the National
Action Plan for Climate Change, China vows to reduce CO2 emissions by 1.5 billion
tonnes by 2010, compared to the 2005 level and also proposes that developing countries
take reasonable and suitable actions to reduce carbon emissions, although without solid
obligation (CCD-NDRC, 2007). At the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference
in Copenhagen, China proposed the goal of reducing carbon intensity by 40 to 45
percent from 2005 levels by 2020 (Finamore 2009). In China the coal-dominant
power sector is a main source for CO2 emissions, accounting for about 32% out of the
total 7.6 billion tonnes of CO2 emissions in 2007 (Wu 2009). To meet the soaring power
demand in a more energy-efficient way, China is encouraging both the development of
large-capacity (above 600 megawatt (MW)) supercritical (SC) or ultra-super critical (USC)
pulverized coal (PC) for new generation units in the next decade, and research and
development of the integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) and is extensively
discussing carbon capture and storage (CCS) (Duan 2008; Chen and Xu 2009; Zhao et al.
2008). By adopting large-scale SC or USC units whose energy efficiency can be over
40%, together with shutting down small-scale and inefficient units, and improving the
grids, China can reduce CO2 emissions by 0.11 billion tonnes by 2010, about 7% of its
target in the National Action Plan for Climate Change. The research and development of
USC, SC, and IGCC technologies and equipments, as well as CCS technologies, are
regarded as a key field to promote technology innovation and the capability of tackling the
climate change (CCD-NDRC, 2007).
CCS in China is perceived as an important technology to reduce carbon emissions from
power plants while meeting the growing energy demand, and there are extensive studies
on this technology (MIT 2007, Liang and Wu 2009). In China, real CCS installation,
designed and built with the power plants from the beginning, is being practiced by the
only one IGCC+CCS demo project, GreenGen IGCC Project in Tianjin. This project is led
by the Huaneng Group, the largest utility company in China, which joined forces with
other major Chinese utilities and Peabody Energy. Shenhua Group, the largest coal
company in China, is also considering the feasibility of CCS installation for its direct coal
liquefaction facilities in Inner Mongolia. However, neither of these two projects has
developed into the stage of construction for CCS. The technological risk remains as a
barrier for China as well as many other countries to adopt CCS widely. Another obstacle
can be the fact that in the near term, there is no indication of carbon-emission regulation
(in the format of carbon tax or cap and trade, for instance) for China's power sector, thus
there is no economic or regulatory incentive for utilities to adopt this expensive, but
immature, technology for their generation units (Liang and Wu 2009).
Large-capacity PC or IGCC reduces carbon emissions through high energy efficiency,
while CCS captures and injects CO2 into underground geological formations. For
example, a 1200MW-scale USC unit has net design energy efficiency of 42% (-295 gram
coal equivalent per kilowatt hour, gce/KWh) and 200MW-scale IGCC's energy efficiency
is high at 41%: a significant increase compared to the 33% average power plant
efficiency in 2005 in China (Zhao et al., 2008; MIT 2007; NDRC 2007). This translates
into a 27% energy-efficiency improvement: high-efficiency generation technology can
reduce coal consumption by 27%, as well as lower CO2 emissions by the same
percentage, without carbon capture and storage. The saving of coal consumption alone
can be a significant incentive for companies to pursue advanced generation technologies,
such as USC PC or IGCC. CCS, can capture 90% of the total carbon emissions, and
considering a 30% energy penalty (additional fuel consumption needed to maintain the
same power output, due to CCS operation), this equals to about 86% of carbon reduction
(MIT 2007). These technologies reduce carbon emissions in different ways and are not
mandated to be combined together.
However, should there be some carbon regulation in China, power plants might choose to
install CCS to control their carbon emissions, in order to reduce their payment for carbon
charges. Wise investors or policy makers for the power industry in China should bear in
mind the impact of future carbon regulation on their investment or policy decision. There
has been growing awareness and demand for intemational or national efforts for
combating global warming. China has already committed to reducing carbon intensity by
40~45% from its 2005 level by 2020, and U.S. Senators Kerry and Lieberman also
proposed a new carbon legislation, the American Power Act. Although this America
Power Act did not pass, it indicates the possibility of carbon regulation in the future. Thus,
investors or policy makers in China should bear in mind how to make their investment
decisions, if there is a carbon price and/or legislation in the future: to invest in PC or IGCC,
with or without CCS. Without considering CCS and carbon prices, researchers expect
IGCC to be more expensive than PC technologies (Zhao et al. 2008; MIT 2009). However,
considering CCS and future carbon prices, according to an MIT study (2009), IGCC might
have a cost advantage over PC. Therefore the carbon price plays a key role in this cost
comparison. As for the case of China, costs of IGCC and PC are expected to be different
from the United States or other countries. Therefore, two key questions arise: 1) What is
the carbon price to justify the investment on CCS for IGCC and PC, should CO2
emissions be charged in the future in China? 2) What is the risk caused by the CO2 price
variation for power plants' investment?
To answer these two questions, I explore the current cost structure for IGCC and PC in
China and the cost of a CCS installation. Then, I build a net present value (NPV) model
integrating carbon prices to identify the breakeven carbon price. Currently there have
been few studies focusing on the cost comparison in China for IGCC and PC, integrating
CCS or the future carbon pricing in China. My study fills this gap and provides
implications for investors and policy makers in China for their decisions related to the
power industry and climate change.
2. CCS and Electricity Generation Technologies in China
China has her own unique characteristics for power-plant investment. Reviewing the
current development of IGCC, large-capacity PC, CCS, and potential carbon regulation, I
identify the cost structures of these technologies in China and illustrate the development
and economics of these technologies in China.
2. 1. IGCC and PC Development in China
Although IGCC technology is still in an experimental and demonstration stage (Zhao et al.
2008), China actually started research on IGCC in the 1970s and is attaching significant
importance to this technology. In 1979, China decided to build its first experimental 10
megawatt (MW) IGCC plant for technical research, but it was stopped for several reasons
(Pang, 2005). During the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Five-Year Plans, China
supported research and development on the analysis and optimization of IGCC systems
(Zhao and Gallagher, 2007). The 863 Program is a critical policy framework among many.
The 863 Program or the State High-tech Development Plan, supervised by the Ministry of
Science and Technology (MOST), sponsors advanced technology R&D in China
including clean-coal technologies and IGCC. The 863 Program of the 11th Five-year Plan
(2006-2010) was initiated in September 2006. MOST appropriated a budget of 3.5 billion
Chinese Yuan (CNY) for energy research, development, and demonstration, among
which 21% was allocated for coal technologies. There is a budget of CNY 0.35 billion for
developing coal gasification-based poly-production projects (these plants produce
syngas from gasification, and use syngas for both chemicals and power generation. This
poly-generation is different from the electricity-oriented IGCC plants in this analysis: for
the purpose of comparing technologies in-kind, we are studying electricity-oriented
generation technologies, thus not discussing poly-generation power plants). China is also
actively seeking international cooperation for this advanced technology. During the
Eleventh Five-Year Plan, several IGCC plants have been proposed or are under
construction in China (Table 3-1). The annual workshops co-sponsored by Energy
Technology Innovation Program of Harvard University and Chinese Academy of
Sciences (CAS), are a powerhouse for exchanging ideas and research between the
United States and China (Zhao, Xiao and Gallagher, 2009).
Table 3- 1: Active IGCC Projects in China
Active Projects Location Capacity Fuel Gasifier C02
MW Vendor Capture
Dongguan IGCC Project (repowered) Dongguan, 2*60 coal CAS Study
Guangdong
Dongguan IGCC Project Dongguan, 4*200 coal CAS Study
Guangdong
Huadian Banshan iGCC Project Hangzhou, 200 coal ECUST Study
Zhejiang
Huaneng IGCC/GreenGen Tianjin 250+400 ** coal TPRI Study
CPIC IGCC Project* Langfang, 2*400 coal N/A Study,
Hebei 8% EOR
*: ECUST, East China University of Science and Technology; CPIC, China Power Investment
Corporation; **: capacities of two stages; EOR: enhanced oil recovery.
Source: Zhao, Xiao, and Gallagher, 2009; Xu 2008.
Pulverized coal, supercritical or ultra supercritical, is viewed in China as a key generation
technology for new coal-fired power plants in the near future (Duan 2008; Chen and Xu
2009; Zhao et al. 2008). The government encourages USC PC and SC PC for new
installed capacity, with 300MW circulating fluidized bed (CFB) as a supplement. Closing
small-size power plants and building large-capacity PC plants, has contributed to the
increase of the efficiency of power generation, and building large-capacity (over 600 MW)
SC or USC for new electricity demand can further strengthen this contribution. The
average coal intensity of China's power sector has decreased from 448 gram coal
equivalent per kilowatt-hour (gce/kWh) in 1980 to 377 gce/kWh in 2005, and it is
expected to drop to 320 gce/kWh in 2020 (NDRC, 2007). From 2004 to 2007 about 124
gigawatts (GW) of 600MW-level supercritical units were installed in China. Some
analysts estimate that by 2020 there will be 30% of the total installed capacity in China
that will be SC units (Chen and Xu 2009; Duan 2008). However, plants that install SC or
USC PC units are not mandated to integrate CCS. CCS technology is still new and costly
thus not suitable for deployment especially when there is no clear policy of carbon
charges.
Given China's strong support for research and development (R&D) of advanced/clean
coal technologies, there is a possibility that in the medium or long term, IGCC can join PC
into the mainstream for the power plant fleet in China. This indicates that China's power
industry planners should consider wise investment decisions with a long-term vision of
both technologies instead of picking only one of them. CCS installed, the cost advantage
between IGCC and PC would largely depends on the carbon price and the capital cost for
CCS installation.
2. 2. Economics of PC and IGCC
Many analysts have examined the economics of coal power generation technologies in
the United States and Europe, considering the option of carbon capture and storage
(EPRI 2000, 2003; NETL 2002; National Coal Council 2004; Nsakala et al. 2003; Bohm et
al. 2007; Sekar et al. 2007; MIT 2007, 2009). Sekar et al. (2007) establish a financial
model comparing the cost of IGCC and PC and the break-even carbon price under the
add-on of CCS after some years' operation of the plants, with data from several previous
studies. Also, MIT has been giving considerable attention to coal-generation technologies
research. The MIT (2007) study summarizes and compares a variety of analyses about
performances and costs of PC and IGCC, with and without carbon capture and storage.
MIT (2009), drawing from a symposium with participants from industry, academia, and
governments, provides an analysis about performance of coal-generation technologies,
as summarized in Table 3-2. However, the capital-cost estimates of power plants have
significantly increased (in the case of the United States). Most recently, EIA (2010)
released the updated estimates of power plants capital costs (Table 3-3). The key
take-away from this EIA study is the significant increase of capital costs for power plants:
about 50% higher than MIT (2009) results (Tables 3-2 and 3-3). Noticing this trend in the
United States, I also update the capital costs of power plants in China with the most
recent data, and reflect it in the modeling in the coming sections,
Table 3- 2: Performance of SC, USC, Oxy-fuel, and IGCC Plants
SC USC PC/Oxy IGCC
CCS -> Without With Without With With Without With
CO2 emitted, g/KWh 830 109 738 94 104 824 101
Efficiency, % HHV 38.5 29.3 43.4 34.1 30.6 38.4 31.7
TCR $/KW 2,159 3,477 2,202 3,390 3,332 2,318 3,071
COE USD-cent/KWh 6.1 9.9 6.0 9.4 8.8 6.6 8.4
Note: 500 MW plant net output (noted by the author, from MIT (2007)); Oxy: oxy-combustion; TCR:
total capital requirement; COE: cost of electricity; HHV: higher heating value. In 2010 US$ (original
data in 2005US$, converted into 2010 US$ via CPI of 111.4 for 2010 (2005 as 100).
Source: MIT 2009.
Table 3- 3: Updated Capital Costs, 2010 (in 2010 US$)
Capacity Heat Rate
(MW) (BTU/KWH)
Single unit advanced PC 650 8,800
With CCS 650 12,000
Dual unit adv. PC 1,300 8,800
With CCS 1,300 12,000
Single unit IGCC 600 8,700
With CCS 520 10,700
O&M: Operation and Maintenance
Source: EIA 2010
Overnight
Capital Cost
(2010$/KW)
3,167
5,099
2,844
4,579
3,565
5,348
Fixed O&M
Cost
(2010$/KW)
35.97
76.62
29.67
63.21
59.23
69.30
Variable
O&M Cost
(2010$/KW)
4.25
9.05
4.25
9.05
6.87
8.04
Studies about IGCC economics in China mainly focus on the cost comparison between
IGCC and PC without considering carbon prices and the cost of CCS. For example, Zhao
and Gallagher (2007) introduced research and development (R&D) and demonstration
projects and policies for advanced coal technologies in China. Chen and Xu (2009)
describe coal's role in China's energy system and discuss the development and policies
for IGCC and carbon capture and storage (CCS) with no cost data provided. Some
institutes, including Tsinghua University (Tsinghua 2008), the Institute of Thermal
Physics in the CAS (Zhao et al. 2008), and the Thermal Physics Research Institute (TPRI)
study the economics of IGCC in China. Among these, Zhao et al. (2008) reveal
performance and economics of PC and IGCC power plants based on data of the design
studies for 12 power plants including two IGCC plants with capacities of 228 MW and 251
MW. Zhao's (2008) case studies, drawing upon projects in China provide the following
results for PC and IGCC technology options (Table 3-3). GreenGen, the largest IGCC
development project in China considers CCS in their IGCC design for Stage Il
(2010-2012) and Stage 1I1 (2013-2015), but these CCS data are preliminary in the design
stage and are confidential. Therefore, these studies provide only limited data regarding
the cost of CCS on PC or IGCC plants.
To overcome the limitation of current data in revealing the investment costs in China, I
collected more data from my trips to China and utility companies' annual reports. The
capital costs are increasing, but not at a dramatic pace, and basically fluctuate around the
level of CNY 4,000/KW. As shown in Table 3-4, Zhao et al. (2008) identified that PC
power plant capital costs are in the range of CNY 4,277 to 5,192 per KW (2010 currency
value). I also draw upon capital costs data from annual reports of Huaneng Group, the
largest utility company in China. Most of Huaneng's new assets are supercritical plants.
As shown in Table 3-5, average capital cost is CNY 3,602 per KW in 2008 and then CNY
3,812 in 2009, a modest increase of 6%. The most recent estimates by Dave, et al. (2011)
show the average capital cost of CNY 4,569/KW for all types of power plants in China
(Table 3-5). The costs in China are significantly lower than those in the United States, as
summarized in Table 3-7. However, as EIA (2010) estimates, power-plant capital costs
have experienced a significant increase in the past two years (Tables 3-2 and 3-3, 64%
increase for PC and 71% for IGCC, benchmarked by MIT (2009) study). Considering this,
(and also bearing in mind that 2008 and 2009 are years with an economic slowdown and
lower commodity prices), I believe the capitals costs for PC plants in 2010 and 2011
should also be increased noticeably. Therefore, in the model, I adopt the same
percentage increase as EIA projected, based on the most recent estimate CNY
4,569/KW or $674/KW, to $1,106/KW (Table 3-7).
For IGCC plants, Zhao et al. (2008) estimate the capital costs of two plants (based on
data of design studies) at CNY 7,433 and 8,842 per KW (Table 3-4). Other sources show
that the unit costs for different IGCC plants vary in a range from CNY 7,625 to CNY
11,250, averaging at CNY 10,097 (2010 currency value) or $1,490/KW (Table 3-6). As
these studies were conducted a few years ago, costs might actually have increased since
then, as EIA (2010) projects. Therefore, I adopt the increase percentage of 71% from EIA
(2010) for IGCC capital costs, which gives $2,548/KW (Table 3-7).
Table 3- 4: Performance of PC and IGCC Plants in China
Performance PC GQC .GCC
1200MW 251MW 228MW
Coal consumption rate (gce/kWh) 290.8 - 311.4 303.9 298.5
Net design efficiency (LHV) 39.5 - 42.3 40.5 41.2
TCR (Yuan/kW) 4,277 - 5,192 8,450 9,720
COE(Chinese cent/KWh), exclusive of pollution charges 29.7 - 31.7 40.9 43.9
COE(Chinese cent/KWh), including pollution charges 29.9 - 31.7 40.9 43.9
Note: Currency values: 2010 CNY (converted from 2006 CNY by CPI of 113.7 of 2010 vs. 100 of
2006). PC plants include 1200MW-scale subcritical, supercritical, and ultra-supercritical units. All
plants are designed without considering CCS. gce = gram standard coal equivalent; LHV = Lower
heating value; MW = Mega-watt;
Source: Zhao et al. 2008.
Table 3- 5: PC Power Plants Economics, China Huaneng Group
Power Plant Investment Capacity Technology Operation Construction TCR
Billion CNY MW months CNY/KW
Shang'an Phase 111 4.55 2*600 Supercritical 2008 24 3,794
Rizhao Phase Il 4.00 2*680 Supercritical 2008 19 2,945
Yuhuang Plant 15.60 4*1,000 Ultra-supercritical 2008 41 3,900
Luohuang, Phase iI| 4.50 2*600 Subcritical 2006 27 3,750
Yingkou, Phase 1I1 4.58 2*600 Ultra-supercritical 2007 29 3,817
Hegang, Phase lI 1.98 1*600 Supercritical 2007 32 3,300
Yangluo, Phase 111 4.45 2*600 Supercritical 2007 27 3,708
Average (2008) 3,602
Fuzhou, Phase 111 5.3 2*600 USC 2010 16 4,417
Yueyang, Phase 1i1 4.3 2*600 USC 2010 22 3,583
Pingliang, Phase II 4.4 2*600 SC 2010 n.a 3,667
Weihai PP, Phase 111 4.7 2*600 USC n.a n.a 3,917
Haimen PP, 7.2 2*1036 USC 2009 24 3,475
Average (2009) 3,812
Dave, etc (2011)* 4,569
*: 4,569 CNY/KWh, 2010 currency value, from overall PC plants, estimated by Dr. Shisen Xu, the
chief technology officer from TPRI.
Source: 2008, 2009 Annual Reports, China Huaneng Group; for each power plant project, I also
searched related news on the Intemet to check the consistency.
Table 3- 6: Some IGCC Plant Designs in China
Power Plant Developer Budget, Capacity TCR
Billion CNY MW CNY/KW
1. Shenyang IGCC* Datang 18.6 4*400 11,610
2. GreenGen, Phase I Huaneng and others 2.3 1*250 9,082
GreenGen, Phase Il* Huaneng and others 5.4 400 13,416
3. Dongguan IGCC Dongguan Electricity and Chemical Inc. 6.3 4*200 7,869
4. Banshan IGCC* Huadian 2.1 200 10,310
5. Langfang IGCC China Power Investment International 6.6 2*400 8,295
Average of IGCC TCR 10,097
Note: numbers from design studies; *, planned or proposed; otherwise under construction as of
May 2010; GreenGen Phase 11, including CCS. The currency values are in 2010 CNY (converted
from 2009 thought CPI increase of 3.2% in 2010).
Source: Utility companies news and Internet reports, including:
1. http://www.cecm.net.cn/news/Elec/2008/06/3527.html,
2. Phase I at http://www.chng.com.cn/n16/n26536/n26584/100382.htm, and phase || at
http://www.cecm.net.cn/news/Region/2007/04/1552.html
3. http://www.cecm.net.cn/news/Region/2007/06/1786.html
4. http://www.cftn.cn/news/cftn_1/20/2007122810545371_1153.html, and
http://power.nengyuan.net/2008/0112/5280.html
5. http://zdt.cpnn.com.cn/template/WebRootj/xianshi.jsp?nid=09031313324925925265
Table 3- 7: Power Plants Capital Costs Comparison
PC IGCC
China (CNY) 4,569 10,097
Nominal exchange rate: 6.78, 2010 674 1,490
Cost hiked as EIA projected (1.64 PC, 1.71 IGCC)* 1,106 2,548
Purchasing power parity exchange rate, 3.92, 2010 1,166 2,576
USA, by EIA 2010 3,167 3,565
Note:
2010 US$ otherwise noted; *1.64 or 1.71 are benchmarked with PC and IGCC cost data from MIT(2009) study, of the similar currency of those Chinese power plants data; these costs are adopted
in modeling; 2010 nominal exchange rate from IRS, URL:
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/smalVintemational/article/0,,id=206089,00.html
2010 PPP exchange rate from http://en.wikipedia.org/wikVRenminbi#Purchasingpower parity
Source: Table 3-2, 3-3, 3-5, and 3-6.
As seen from the above tables, and also expected by many analysts, Chinese power
plants have much lower cost or capital investment compared to the United States (Zhao,
Xiao and Gallagher 2009). Benchmarked by the market exchange rate, the capital costs
for PC in the United States is $3,167/KW for SC and $3,565/KW IGCC according to the
most recent estimates by EIA (2010), while in China the numbers are 674 and 1,490
(benchmarked by the market exchange rate), less than half those of the USA. Even if I
assume that during the past two years, power plants capital costs have increased
significantly (EIA, 2010), China's power plants' costs are still only $1,106/KWh for PC and
$2,548/KWh for IGCC. Figure 3-1 shows this comparison.
However, what is the cost comparison if benchmarked to the real exchange rate,
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate? Given the long-lasting debate about the
under-valuation of the Chinese Yuan, this PPP-based comparison might yield different
results - this is not the focus of this paper, but it can provide another perspective for the
readers to understand the costs of power plant investment in China. The PPP exchange
rate is deduced by finding goods available for purchase in both currencies and comparing
the total cost for those goods in each currency - thus a 'real' exchange rate. China's
IGCC plants costs, if benchmarked by the PPP exchange rate of 3.92 in 2010, would be
more expensive, but still lower than the United States. As shown in Figure 3-2, the total
capital requirement for PC in China is $1,166/KW, and IGCC's cost estimates in China
now becomes as high as $2,567/KW: still much less expensive than in the United States
Although currently there is no more recent data available (e.g., 2010 power plants costs),
I am inclined to the view that the costs should also be significantly higher compared to a
couple years ago when the global economy was in a recession, as EIA (2010) estimates.
Therefore, in this analysis, I adopt the 'increased' cost estimates, i.e., $1,106/KW for PC,
and $2,548/KW for IGCC, as the base scenario in modeling.
Given the above cost estimates, an analyst might wonder why power plants in China are
much cheaper to construct than in the United States. This can be another interesting
question to explore. However, given the limited time and resources, I will leave this
question, which is not the purpose of this study, for future research.
2010 US$ * China (exchange rate) China (increased as EIA projcted) m USA
4,000 -
3,565
3,167
3,000 -
2,548
2,000 -
1,490
1,106
1,000
PC IGCC
Figure 3- 1: Market Exchange Rate Based Costs Comparison: China vs. USA
Note: Costs are total cost requirement, TCR.
2010 US$ * China (purchsing power parity) * USA
4,000
3,565
3,167
3,000 -,7
2,000
1,166
1,000
PC IGCC
Figure 3- 2: PPP Exchange Rate Based Costs Comparison: China vs. USA
Note: Costs are total cost requirement, TCR.
2. 3. Carbon prices and CCS
Currently, there is no legislation on CO2 emissions in China, but there is a goal of
carbon-intensity reduction by 40 to 45 percent from 2005 levels by 2020, and also a
near-term target of 1.5 billion tonnes of CO2 emissions reduction by 2010 as stated by the
NDRC. Therefore, China relies on increasing energy efficiency, developing renewable
energy, developing advanced coal-fired generation technologies, and other measures.
The 1.5 billion tonnes CO2 reduction by 2010 means that about 20% of China's 2007 total
CO2 emissions must be captured. Although China does not set any explicit regulation for
the CO2 emissions, her current efforts might imply a possibility of carbon regulation in the
future.
To reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector, in addition to encouraging those
large-capacity and high-efficiency generation units, Chinese policy makers perceive CCS
as a critical (although currently unsuitable for commercialization) technology. However,
each stage of CCS, capture, transport, and storage, is capital and energy intensive, and
will impact the cost of electricity or other industrial commodities as materials for CCS
equipments (McCoy 2008). In China, although many experts agree that CCS should be
considered a method for combating climate change because of the increase of coal
consumption and the compatibility with current coal-dominant energy system, they hold
that currently CCS is far from being deployable on a commercial scale due to high cost
and technological uncertainties, and other reasons (Liang and Wu 2009).
In China CCS research focuses on the capture stage. There are a few enhanced oil
recovery (EOR) and enhanced coal bed methane projects, but China lacks the integrated
technology for transportation, injection, monitoring, and risk control (Liang and Wu 2009).
In terms of the cost of CCS, a literature review shows a range of $30-$70 per tonne,
based on studies conducted some years ago. For instance, MIT (2007) estimates that the
cost of CO2 capture and pressurization is about $25/tonne, and the transportation and
storage cost is about $5Aonne, which requires a carbon-dioxide price of $30/tonne to
make CCS economically viable. Similarly, the Boston Consulting Group (2008) estimates
that then-current CCS implementation cost would be 45 Euro per tonne, and by 2030 it
can be decreased to 30 Euro per tonne if 500 billion euro investment from government
subsidies and company during this period. AI-Juaied and Whitmore (2009) estimate a
range of 35 to 70 US dollars per tonne (2008$) for carbon-capture costs. In China,
laboratory data shows that the cost of CO2 capture is 0.19-0.25 Yuan/KWh, or
$38-50/tonne CO2, assuming 0.6 tonnes CO2/MWh captured (Sekar et al. 2008) and an
exchange rate of 7 for USD/CNY. However CO2 transportation and storage cost is less
studied and known in China's case (Liang and Wu 2009). Currently there are no data
available to reveal incremental capital investment for CCS installation in China.
GreenGen, the IGCC+CCS demo project in China, shows a gross unit cost of CNY
13,000 for the second stage 400MW IGCC plus CCS. But GreenGen is still at the
designing stage, and no specific data are available for CCS. Even TPRI (Thermal Power
Research Institute), the leading power generation technology institute that is developing
IGCC for the GreenGen Project in China, had to cite the U.S. CCS cost data in their
presentation about the GreenGen (IGCC+CCS) project (Xu, 2006, 2008).
Therefore to overcome the limitation of data availability, I identify CCS cost from the
incremental capital investment to power plants. I devise a CCS Incremental Index, as
summarized in the following table. The average incremental cost percentages of several
studies are 66% for PC and 34% for IGCC. I separate EIA data as they are the most
recent estimates, different from other studies in this summary in considering the likely
augmented capital costs. Given that EIA numbers are in line or not significantly different
from the average, i.e., 61% vs. 66%, and 50% vs. 34%, I adopt the EIA numbers for
modeling, in order to reflect the most recent cost structure.
Table 3- 8: CCS Incremental Capital Costs Index
PC IGCC
1. Hamilton (2009) 61% 51%
80% 16%
82% 32%
39% 40%
35%
2. Sekar (2007) 73% 30%
3. MIT (2009) 57% 32%
Average 66% 34%
EIA (2010) 61% 50%
Note: The incremental capital cost resulted from CCS related to the capital cost of the power plant
Source: 1. Hamilton (2009) summarizes costs data from various sources including CERA, NETL,
EPRI, AEP, and others. 2. PC data from MIT (2009) are the average of SC and USC technologies.
3. Methodology and Data
To calculate the costs and identify the optimal investment decision under carbon prices, I
adopt the net present value (NPV) methodology. Appropriate assumptions for China's
case are critical to build this NPV model, but it is also challenging given the limitation of
current data and literature. Through communicating with scholars, engineers, and
government officers during my field trips in China, combined with data from the literature
review, I made assumptions which best represent the situation in China.
The power plants of question have the following characteristics, for both PC and IGCC:
- installed capacity, 600MW,
- annual operation hours, 6000, according to Zhao et al. (2008) design data43,
- operational life, 40 years,
- energy penalty with CCS, 28% for PC, and 17% for IGCC (Table 3-9)
- tax rate, 40%,
- depreciation, linear, 6.3% per year for 15 years, then 5% salvage value remains,
- discount rate of 6%, and
- thermal coal price, CNY 700/tonne, equal to $5.2/MMBTU.
Table 3- 9: Energy Penalty
PC IGCC Source
31% 16% Rubin, Chen and Rao, 2007 (Camegie Mellon)
21-24% 19% MIT 2009
28% 14% Herzog and Golomb, 2004 (MIT)
- 20% NETL 2010
30-40% - IPCC 2005
28% 17% Aggregated average
Source: listed in the table
More performance parameters are summarized and explained in Table 3-11. Based on
an extensive literature review and survey in China, I believe the following assumptions
adequately represent the performance of typical power plants in China.
43 In 2010, average operation hours of thermal power plants are 5,329, 5% of increase frm 2009,
according to China Power International, one of the major utilities in China. CPI also projects 2011
operation hours will stay the same as 2010. See http://www.chinapower.hk/jb/ir/faq.htm. Therefore, 6,000
is not a low number, as power plants usually need days for maintenance, etc.
Table 3- 10: China CPI
Year CPI (2006=100)
2000 92.4
2001 92.8
2002 92.1
2003 93.2
2004 96.8
2005 98.6
2006 100.0
2007 104.8
2008 110.9
2009 110.2
2010* 113.7
Note: CPI, Consumer price index
Source: NBS, Measuringworth. URL: http-//www.measuringworth.com, and
http://www.chinamining.org/News/201 0-01-21/1264055685d33624.html.
Table 3- 11: Power Plants Assumptions
Performances and Assumptions Without CCS With CCS
PC IGCC PC IGCC
1. Capital cost (Million $) 663 1,529 1,068 2,293
Capital cost ($/KW) 1,106 2,548 1,780 3,822
2. Net heat rate (BTU/KWH) 8,441 8,361 11,724 10,074
3. Fuel input (Annual, Million MMBTU) 30.4 30.1 42.2 36.3
4. Fuel costs($Million) 157.8 156.3 219.1 188.3
5. O&M costs ($Million) 16.6 53.5 42.2 95.6
6. CO2 emissions (Tonne/MWH) 0.669 0.663 0.086 0.078
7. CO2 emissions (Million tonnes/year) 2.41 2.39 0.31 0.28
Note: based on 600 MW capacity power plants.
1. Based on TCR data from Table 3-7, US$ 1,106/KW for PC and US$ 2,548/KW for IGCC.
CCS installation increases the capital costs by 61% for PC, and 50% for IGCC, based on EIA
(2010) estimates. Total capital costs (Million $) = Unit cost ($/KV) * 600/1000
2. The coal rates are 304.1 gCoe/KWh and 301.2gCoe/KWh for PC and IGCC (Zhao et al. 2008),
without CCS. Multiplying 27.76Btu/gCoe, to get the net heat rates. For with CCS, considering 28%
energy penalty for PC and 17% for IGCC, i.e., fuel = net heat rates / (1-energy penalty).
3. Fuel input = net heat rate * Annual operation hours * capacity factor * capacity * unit conversion
4. Fuel costs = fuel input * coal price. The coal price is assumed to be CNY 700/Metric Tonnes of
raw coal at 2010 prices (thus, CNY 980/Metric Tonnes of standard coal), equals to $5.2/MMBtu,
considering a heat content of 27.76MMBTU/Metric tonnes of standard coal.
5. Assuming 2.5% and 3.5% of Capex for annual O&M Costs for PC and IGCC (from Zhao et al.
(2008) design studies data). With CCS, the O&M costs include $5/tonne for all the CO2 emissions.
e.g., for IGCC with CCS, O&M = 3.5%*Capex + $5 * CO 2 emissions /(1 -energy penalty) * capture
rate.
6. Without CCS, assuming 60% carbon content and 27.76 MMBTU per tonne for standard coal.
CO2 emissions per MWH = net heat rate/1 000/27.76 * 60% * 44/12; with CCS, consider energypenalty and 90% capture rate, i.e., =emissions * (1+ penalty) * 10%.
7. Annual CO2 emission = CO2 emissions / MWH * capacity * annual operation hours * capacity
factor.
For the NPV model, the breakeven C02 price is the price that makes the saving of carbon
charge from installing CCS on par with the incremental investment for CCS. With CCS
installation, a power plant would have a higher capital expense, higher fuel costs and
O&M costs due to the energy penalty and operating the CCS unit, and also different
cash-flow elements including depreciation, taxes, tax shields, and others. But the savings
from paying a lower carbon charge can offset this additional cost. I attach the NPV
models in the Appendix, and the spreadsheets are also attached separately for readers'
reference.
4. Results and Discussion
A carbon price of $61/tonne is necessary to justify the CCS investment for PC plants,
while for IGCC plants, the breakeven price is higher, at $72/tonne. The price gap
between the two technologies is mainly caused by the difference in capital costs. As
shown in Table 3-11, without CCS, the IGCC capital requirement is $2,548 per KW, and
PC is $1,106 per KW: IGCC is 130% more expensive than PC. With CCS installation,
IGCC is 110% more expensive than PC. IGCC, with gasification technologies, is more
complicated than PC plants, thus more expensive. Higher capital costs explain the bulk of
this difference of breakeven carbon prices.
The estimates of carbon prices are slightly above the range of estimates by other
analysts. For example, costs for CCS are estimated at $35-70/tonne by Harvard
(Al-Juaied & Whitmore 2009), and Euro 45/tonne in the near term and Euro 30/tonne by
2030 (BCG 2008), and or $30/tonne by MIT (2007). Sekar et al. (2008) identified the
breakeven price at $21/tonne for PC while $45/tonne for IGCC, for retrofit for CCS after 4
years' operation. Given the cost increases during the past years as EIA (2010) estimates,
the results about carbon prices are basically in line with this upward trend and can
reasonably reflect the situation in China. However, the prices from our analysis are
significantly higher than the recent international carbon price, for instance, the CER price
of 16 Euro per tonne (Future price of December 2012 Certified Emission Reduction, CER,
in European Climate Exchange priced at EUR 16/tonne, September 2010, according to
Bloomberg). This high CO2 price threshold, then, indicates a potential financial barrier to
make CCS investment in China in the near term, as the lower carbon price would be
insufficient to justify investment for CCS if the carbon charge savings are the main profit
source for CCS installation.
The breakeven carbon prices are subject to the impacts of several parameters. Volatility
of each parameter would introduce the variation of breakeven carbon prices, thus,
different profit or loss scenario for investors. It is worthy to explore how some key
parameters impact the carbon prices, in order to highlight the risks for investment and
provide implications for investors.
4.1 Capital Costs
Power plants' capital costs are a key factor that affects the carbon price. As shown in the
following table, for PC plants, if the unit capital cost decreases by 20% to $885/KW, the
breakeven carbon price becomes lower by about $5, or 8%, which translates into an
elasticity of 0.4. In the case of IGCC, a 20% lower Capex introduces a carbon price of $10,
about 14%, an elasticity of roughly 0.7. IGCC, which incurs higher capital costs, is more
sensitive to the change in capital costs. When the capital cost is low, for example, 40%
less than the base scenario, the breakeven carbon prices for PC and IGCC are
approximately similar: $51 and $52. The lower the capital costs are, the narrower the
carbon prices between PC and IGCC. Whereas, IGCC requires a higher carbon price to
justify CCS installation when the capital costs are larger, as shown in Figure 3-3.
Table 3- 12: Capital Costs and CO2 Prices
TCR, PC, CO2 Price, Elasticity IG$/KW $/KW for PC $/
-60% 442 46.3
-40% 663 51.2
-20% 885 56.1
Base 1,106 61.0 0.4
+20% 1,327 65.8
Note: other assumptions remain unchanged while conducting
$/Tonne
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Figure 3- 3: Capital Costs and CO2 Price
C, CO2 price, Elasticity
KW for IGCC
1,019 42.3
1,529 52.3
2,038 62.2
2,548 72.2 0.7
3,057 82.1
this sensitivity analysis.
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4.2 Fuel Cost
Another key factor is the fuel cost, or the price of coal. Steam Coal is the main fuel for
power plants in China, thus accounting for a significant portion of operating costs. Thus,
variation in the price of coal also determines the volatility of carbon price needed to justify
CCS investment. If the coal price increases by 20% to $6.2/MMBTU, the breakeven
carbon price increases by about $6 for PC (10%), and $3 for IGCC (4%). This implies an
elasticity of coal price at 0.5 for the breakeven carbon price for PC, while 0.2 for IGCC:
IGCC is less sensitive to coal price volatility than PC, due to the fact that it has a bit
higher energy efficiency (net heat rate of 8,361 BTU/KWh vs. 8,441 BTU/KWh) and its
lower energy penalty (17% vs. 28%), both of which cushions some of the coal-price
volatility shock, compared to PC. If the coal price keeps increasing, as shown in Figure
3-4, we would expect IGCC to demand a lower breakeven carbon price than PC. For
example, if the price is doubled to CNY1,400 per tonne, or $10.4/MMBTU, IGCC requires
$87.4/tonne CO2 price to justify its CCS investment, while PC needs $90. In general,
when the fuel cost increases, IGCC is catching up with PC in the economy for CCS
installation.
Table 3- 13: Fuel Costs and CO2 Prices
Price scenarios Coal Price ($/MMBTU) CO2 Price for PC CO2 price for IGCC
-50% 2.596 46.3 64.6
-20% 4.153 55.1 69.1
Base 5.192 61.0 72.2
+20% 6.230 66.8 75.2
+50% 7.787 75.6 79.8
+100% 10.383 90.2 87.4
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Figure 3- 4: Coal and CO2 Prices
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The coal price in China has been high for the past couple years, above CNY 700/tonne.
Bohai-rim steam coal price index (BSPI), China's first govemment-backed coal price
index to reflect the coal prices for major ports around the Bohai-rim in China, for 2010 and
early 2011 is fluctuating between CNY 700 and 800 per tonne, as shown in the following
graph. Given the growing demand due to economic development and increasing net coal
imports since 2008, there is a good chance that this 'high' price is unlikely to tumble in the
near future. Feng Ping, an official from National Energy Administration under NDRC,
expects that "in 2011 [the coal price] is expected to stay around the level registered at the
end of 2010" (HSN, 2011). NDRC in December 2010 ordered "the price of the country's
2011 major coal-supplying contracts to remain unchanged from 2010" and "no excuse for
a price increase" would be allowed (Chen, 2010), which also reflects the pressure from
soaring coal prices.
Therefore, bear in mind that a coal price of $5.2/MMBTU, equal to CNY 700/Tonne of raw
coal in China, is still a modest coal-price assumption for China. If the coal price continues
to augment in the future, the breakeven CO2 price will also increase with this trend,
whereas IGCC might be gaining an advantage for CCS investment due to its saving in
coal consumption.
CNY Historical Trend of BSPI Coal Prices
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Figure 3- 5: BSPI Weekly Average Price
Note: BSPI, Bohai-Rim Steam-coal Price Index; Prices for 5500Kcal/kg steam coal.
Source: http://www.osc.org.cn/Coallndex/chs/new/index.html#bohai_1
4.3 Investment Return
In addition to capital costs and fuel prices, investors might also need to understand how
their investment return is affected under different carbon price scenarios. PC and IGCC
plants call for different breakeven carbon prices to justify CCS investments, which
indicate that, under one carbon price, PC and IGCC plants might have different
investment returns. As shown in Table 3-14, under the low carbon price scenarios, e.g.,
$40, or $50 per tonne, both PC and IGCC would have losses, and IGCC has a larger
exposure to this loss due to its higher capital investment for both power plants and CCS
installation. As the carbon price increases, both types of power plants gain improving
returns, but PC still gains a more resilient profit or loss profile than IGCC. A carbon price
at $70/Tonne would generate a total return of $171 million for a PC plant,, which is still
insufficient to make IGCC plus CCS installation profitable. This trend delivers a signal that
if investing for CCS, only based on carbon prices, and all other factors being equal,
investors might prefer PC plants to IGCC, as the former carries a better investment return
from the carbon-charge savings.
Table 3- 14: CO 2 Price and CCS Investment Return
CO 2 Price Profit for CCS Investment, Profit for CCS Investment,$/Tonne PC, $Mn IGCC, $Mn
40 (397) (612)
50 (208) (421)
60 (18) (231)
70 171 (41)
80 361 149
90 551 339
100 740 529
$Mn
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Figure 3-6: CO 2 Price and CCS Investment Return
5. When to Invest in CCS?
For investors, it is critical to acknowledge when would be an appropriate entry time to
invest for CCS. There are two important factors to bear in mind for CCS investment: the
technology innovation, which can reduce the capital expense, and the carbon price,
which can be affected by international or national efforts for combating climate change.
Investment for CCS for coal-fueled power plants can become cheaper as more
technology innovation is achieved. Also, the debut of international climate change
protocol or the US climate change legislation, if any, can be a bullish driver for
international carbon prices. For example, the American Power Act proposed by US
Senators John Kerry and Joe Lieberman in May 2010 suggested a price collar for carbon
charges of $12 and $25/T in the first year (2013), with annual escalations according to
CPI at a rate of 3% and 5% for the floor and ceiling, respectively. This indicates the
carbon price can be as high as $43 in 2020 and $93 by 2030, assuming a 3% increase in
the CPI.
To answer the question when to invest in CCS, I conduct a scenario simulation based on
the following assumptions:
- an annual 10% decrease for unit capital costs due to technology innovation",
- an annual 4% decrease for breakeven carbon price for PC at the elasticity of 0.4
discussed previously, and 7% for IGCC at the elasticity of 0.7.
- intemational carbon prices in line with the medium of the price scenarios
suggested by Kerry-Lieberman.
" 10% annually might be an aggressive assumption. But this is just an example of how capital costs affect
the entry time of investment. Also, we are simulating for China, where many power plants are being built
each year, and a significant amount of investment is made for energy technology innovation. In this context,
10% is not a greatly unrealistic assumption.
There are a couple takeaways from this simulation. First, the required breakeven CO2
price decreases accordingly when the capital costs is decreased due to technology
innovation, and in 2015, IGCC turns as competitive as PC in investing for CCS
installation as they have a very close CO2 breakeven price at about $50 per tonne.
Second, by 2024, the international carbon price can be sufficient to justify the CCS
investment for IGCC power plants, but not yet PC plants. Then, four years later, in 2028,
the carbon price rises to about $31/tonne, and becomes high enough to ensure a positive
investment return for PC plants. Still, from this point on, investing in CCS for IGCC plants
yields a higher return.
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Figure 3- 7: When to Invest for CCS
Table 3- 15: Technology Innovation and Carbon Pricing
Year PC IGCC K-L Price
Breakeven C Breakeven
Cost, CO 2 Price, Cost, CO2 Price, Medium, Floor, Ceiling,$/KW $/Tonne $/KW $ITonne $/Tonne $/Tonne $/Tonne
2010 1,106 61.0 2,548 72.2
2011 995 58.5 2,293 67.1
2012 896 56.2 2,064 62.4
2013 806 53.9 1,857 58.0 16.3 11.0 21.6
2014 725 51.8 1,672 54.0 17.0 11.3 22.7
2015 653 49.7 1,505 50.2 17.7 11.7 23.8
2016 588 47.7 1,354 46.7 18.5 12.0 25.0
2017 529 45.8 1,219 43.4 19.3 12.4 26.3
2018 476 44.0 1,097 40.4 20.1 12.7 27.6
2019 428 42.2 987 37.6 21.0 13.1 28.9
2020 386 40.5 888 34.9 21.9 13.5 30.4
2021 347 38.9 800 32.5 22.9 13.9 31.9
2022 312 37.3 720 30.2 23.9 14.3 33.5
2023 281 35.9 648 28.1 25.0 14.8 35.2
2024 253 34.4 583 26.1 26.1 15.2 36.9
2025 228 33.0 525 24.3 27.2 15.7 38.8
2026 205 31.7 472 22.6 28.4 16.1 40.7
2027 184 30.5 425 21.0 29.7 16.6 42.8
2028 166 29.2 382 19.5 31.0 17.1 44.9
2029 149 28.1 344 18.2 32.4 17.6 47.1
2030 134 26.9 310 16.9 33.8 18.2 49.5
2031 121 25.9 279 15.7 35.3 18.7 52.0
2032 109 24.8 251 14.6 36.9 19.3 54.6
2033 98 23.8 226 13.6 38.6 19.8 57.3
2034 88 22.9 203 12.6 40.3 20.4 60.2
2035 79 22.0 183 11.8 42.1 21.0 63.2
2036 71 21.1 165 10.9 44.0 21.7 66.3
Note: Power plants costs and CO 2prices are all at 2010 value. K-L prices start in 2013 with
then-current value of $12 and $25 for floor and ceiling, benchmarked to 2010 by annual CPI of 3%,
then the flooring and ceiling grow at 3% and 5%, respectively, according to the CPI. The medium
price is the average of the floor and the ceiling prices.
6. Conclusion
This study shows that, given the current technology and costs, a carbon price of
$61/tonne is required to justify the investment on CCS for a typical PC plant in China, and
a higher price of $72/tonne is necessary to make the similar investment for an IGCC plant
feasible. With the same CO2 price, PC shows a better investment return than IGCC for
CCS investment in China.
Both capital costs and coal prices affect the breakeven C02 prices significantly. A
decrease of 20% in the unit capital cost of power plants will lower the breakeven CO2
price by 8% for a PC plant, and by 14% for an IGCC plant. Currently China's coal price is
at $5.2/MMBTU or higher, and will likely be at this level for the near future or longer. If the
coal price fluctuates by 20%, the breakeven CO2 price will decrease by about 10% for PC
and 5% for IGCC. For IGCC, the breakeven CO2 price is less sensitive to coal price
volatility due to IGCC's higher energy efficiency.
I also conduct a simulation to determine the investors' entry time for CCS investment.
IGCC begins earlier than PC to become feasible for CCS investment: by 2024, the
international carbon price can be sufficient to justify the CCS investment for IGCC power
plants. Then in 2028, the carbon price hikes to about $31/tonne, and can ensure a
positive investment retum for PC plants as well.
In this study, I have laid a foundation to understand the breakeven carbon price for CCS
investment in China. This research can be advanced with data from real projects in China
as they become available. Currently the GreenGen project is being built in China, and
China, Europe, and the United States are building or planning more "power plants + CCS"
projects: more data based on these real projects can help improve the study of the
breakeven C02 price and make it more valuable for investment decisions and policy
making. I also note that power plants costs are significantly lower in China than in the
United States: why this is the case can be a topic for future research.
Appendix: the NPV Model
A.1 Evaluation of a typical PC plant in China, w/ and w/o CCS
PV of costs exclusive of carbon charge ($ rmillion)
Wthout Capture
1 Capital investment
2 Depreciation
3 Insurance and property taxes
4 Fuel cost
5 O&M cost
8 Tax shield at 40%
7 Total cash now
8 Present Value at 8%
9 NPV, 40 years
Wth Capture
10 Capital investment
11 Depreciation
12 Insurance and property taxes
13 Fuel cost
14 O&M cost (ind. CO2 trans & Strg.)
15 Tax shield at 40%
18 Total cash flow
17 Present Value at 8%
18 NPV through 40 years
19 PV incremental cost of capture
PV of carbon charge at a certain prics, $1/tCO2, ($ ml)
without capture
20 cash flow per $1ACO2 carbon tax
21 aftertax
22 Present Value at 8%
23 NPV, through 40 years
W carbon capture from the first operation year
24 cash flow per $1A C02 carbon tax
25 after tax
28 Present Value
27 NPV through year 40
28 PV savings from capture per $11t charge
-663
41.8 -41.8 -41.8 -41.8 41.8 41.8 41.8
-11.8 -11.8 -11.8 -11.8 -11.8 -11.8 -11.8
-157.8 -157.8 -157.8 157.8 -157.8 -157.8 -157.8
-16.6 -16.6 -15.6 -16.6 -16.8 -16.5 -16.6
91.2 91.2 91.2 91.2 91.2 91.2 912
.663 -95.0 -95.0 -95.0 -95.0 -950 -950 -95.0
-663 -89.6 -84.5 -79.7 -75.2 -71.0 -67.0 -632
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-19.0 -19.0 -19.0 -19.0 -19.0 -19.0 -19.0
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422 422 42.2 -42.2 422 422 422
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-1068 -141.3 -141.3 -141.3 -141.3 -141.3 -141.3 -141.3
-1088 -1333 -1257 -118.6 -111.9 -1056 -99.8 -94.0
-3337
-1156
-24 -24 -2.4 -2.4 -24 -24 -2.4
-1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4
-1.4 -1.3 -1.2 -1.1 -1.1 -1.0 -1.0
-0.3 -0.3 -0.3
-0.2 -0.2 -0Q2
-0.2 -0.1 -0.1
19
0.0 010 0.0
-115 -11.8 -11.8
-157. -157.8 -157.8
-188 -16.6 -16.6
745 74.5 74.5
-111.7 -111.7 -111.7
-122 -11.5 -10.9
0.0 0.0 0.0
-190 -19.0 -19.0
-219.1 -219.1 -219.1
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112.1 1121 1121
-1682 -18.2 -168.2
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-1.4 -1.4 -1.4
-02 -1 -01
-0.3 -(3 -0.3
-02 -0.2 -42
0.0 (10 0.0
29 Carbon price required to warrant CCS W%
Note:
2 Linear depreciation, 6.3% per year until Year 15, then 5% salvage value without depreciation (Zhao et al. 2008)
3 1.78% of intial capital investment (1.78% adopted from Sekar. et al (2007); our interview
with Banshan Power Plant showed a rate from 0.65% - 3.7%
4 from assumptions
5 from assumptions
6 =40 % * sum (Row 2:5)
7 =sum (Row 3 : 6)
8 =Row 7/(1+discount rate)^ of years
9 sum of al the present values at Row 8
11-1 8 similar to the above 2- 9
19 = Row 18 - Row 9
20 =$1 A* annual C02 emission from assumptions
21 =(1-40%)*Row20
22 =Row 21 / (1+discount rate)A# of years
23 =sum of values in Row 22
24-27 similar to the above 20-23
28 =Row 27- Row 23
29 =Row 19/R ow 28
A.2 Evaluation of a typical IGCC plant in China, w/ and w/o CCSI ~ 
____4:
PV of costs exclusive of carbon charge ($ million)
Without Capture
1 Capital investment
2 Depreciation
3 Insurance and property taxes
4 Fuel cost
5 O&M cost
6 Tax shield at 40%
7 Total cash flow
8 Present Value at 6%
9 NPV, 40 years
With Capture
10 Capital investment
11 Depreciation
12 Insurance and property taxes
13 Fuel cost
14 O&M cost (ind. C02 trans & Strg.)
15 Tax shield at 40%
16 Total cash flow
17 Present Value at 6%
18 NPV through 40 years
19 PV incremental cost of capture
PV of carbon charge at a certain prices, $1/tCO2, ($ mil)
without capture
20 cash low per $1/t C02 carbon tax
21 after tax
22 Present Value at 6%
23 NPV, through 40 years
w/ carbon capture from the first operation year
24 cash flow per $1/t C02 carbon tax
25 aftertax
26 Present Value
27 NPV through year 40
28 PV savings from capture per $1t charge
-1529
-96.3 -96.3 -96.3 -96.3 -96.3 -96.3 -96.3
-27.2 -27.2 -27.2 -27.2 -27.2 -27.2 -27.2
-156.3 -156.3 -156.3 -156.3 -156.3 -156.3 -156.3
-53.506 -53.51 -53.5059 -53.506 -53.5059 -53.51 -53.51
133.3 133.3 133.3 133.3 133.3 133.3 133.3
-1529 -103.7 -103.7 -103.7 -103.7 -103.7 -103.7 -103.7
-1529 -97.8 -92.3 -87.0 -82.1 -77.5 -73.1 -68.9
-3291
-2293
-144.5 -144.5 -144.5 -144.5 -144.5 -144.5 -144.5
-40.8 -40.8
-188.3 -188.3
-95.6 -95.6
187.7 187.7
-2293 -137.0 -137.0
-2293 -129.3 -122.0
-4663
-1372
-22
-40.8
-188.3
-95.6
187.7
-137.0
-115.1
-2.39 -2.39 -2.39
-1.43 -1.43 -1.43
-1.35 -1.27 -1.20
-0.28 -0.28 -0.28
-0.17 -0.17 -0.17
-0.16 -0.15 -0.14
-40.8
-188.3
-95.6
187.7
-137.0
-108.5
-2.39
-1.43
-1.13
-0.28
-0.17
-0.13
-40.8 -40.8 -40.8
-188.3 -188.3 -188.3
-95.6 -95.6 -95.6
187.7 187.7 187.7
-137.0 -137.0 -137.0
-102.4 -96.6 -91.1
-2.39 -2.39 -2.39
-1.43 -1.43 -1.43
-1.07 -1.01 -0.95
-0.28 -0.28 -0.28
-0.17 -0.17 -0.17
-0.13 -0.12 -0.11
0.0 0.0 0.0
-27.2 -27.2 27.2
-156.3 -156.3 -156.3
-53.51 -53.51 -53.51
94.8 94.8 73.0
-142.2 -142.2 -109.5
-15.5 -14.7 -10.6
0.0 0.0 0.0
-40.8 -40.8 -40.8
-188.3 -188.3 -188.3
-95.6 -95.6 -95.6
129.9 129.9 129.9
-194.8 -194.8 -194.8
-21.3 -20.1 -18.9
-2.39 -2.39 -2.39
-1.43 -1.43 -1.43
-0.16 -0.15 -0.14
-0.28 -0.28 -0.28
-0.17 -0.17 -0.17
-0.02 -0.02 -0.02
29 Carbon price required to warrant CCS Ij
Note:
2 Linear depreciation, 6.3% per year until Year 15, then 5% salvage value without depreciation (Zhao et al 2008)
3 1.78% of initial capital investment (1.78% adopted from Sekar. et al (2007); our interview
with Banshan Power Plant showed a rate from 0.65% ~ 3.7%
4 from assumptions
5 from assumptions
6 =40% * sum (Row 2:5)
7 =sum (Row 3 : 6)
8 =Row 7/(1 +discount rate)A# of years
9 sum of all the present values at Row 8
11-18 similar to the above 2- 9
19 =Row 18-Row9
20 =$1I /* annual C02 emission from assumptions
21 =(1-40%)*Row 20
22 =Row 21 / (1 +discount rate)A# of years
23 =sum of values in Row 22
24-27 similar to the above 20-23
28 =Row 27- Row 23
29 =Row 19/Row 28
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